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AN OVERVIEW OF ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN NIGERIA 
1.0 Introduction 
Impeccable democratic elections are unobtainable.
1
 This is because elections, by their nature, 
are prone to errors and disputes.
2
 Consequently, Electoral Dispute Resolution (EDR) is an 
unavoidable component of an electoral system. Its effectiveness, to a large extent, determines 
the efficacy of an electoral system, the stability of a political system and the consolidation of 
democratic governance in a state.
3
 In realisation of this relationship, democratic states have 
adopted diverse mechanisms, including Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), to ensure 
efficiency in EDR.  
This dissertation investigates whether Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) can 
function as an effective EDR mechanism in Nigeria, considering the nature of electoral 
disputes and the socio-political milieu of Nigeria.
4
 Specifically, this dissertation will address 
the following questions: 
 What effect do the peculiar features of the Nigerian socio-political and electoral 
disputes setting have on the adoption of ADR in EDR in Nigeria? 
 What is the impact of the current EDR legal framework and mechanism on the 
adoption of ADR in EDR in Nigeria? 
 How viable is the application of ADR in EDR within the Nigerian socio-political 
environment? 
 What are the indices for effective adoption and application of ADR in the Nigerian 
EDR system?  
 
 
                                                          
1
 Shaheen Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler ‘The comparative study of electoral governance: Introduction’ (2002) 
23 Int’l Pol Sc Rev 5 at 6. 
2
 West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) Election Dispute Management for West Africa: A Training 
Manual (2013) 22. 
3
Avery Davis-Roberts ‘International obligations for electoral dispute resolution’ (2009) 1, available at 
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/des/edr-approach-paper.pdf, accessed on 2 
August, 2017 
4
 In this dissertation the term ‘dispute’ means a grievance, disagreement or competing claim over an issue, 
manifested in a variety of ways such as protest, complaint and litigation, while ‘resolution’ means a reasonably 
satisfactory and lasting settlement of grievances, competing claims or disagreement between parties and entails 




1.2 Background of the study 
For various reasons, elections are susceptible to errors and disputes. Elections entail human 
interactions that are inherently prone to dispute due to diversity of backgrounds, personalities 
and interests. They also involve substantial economic resources and provide opportunity for 
the redistribution of such resources.
5
 As such, they stimulate dispute due to competition over 
control of the resources, which are ordinarily scarce. Disputes are also inevitable due to 
human fallibility and the complex nature of elections; election officials can make mistakes or 
take actions that may be considered unacceptable by others, and for those so affected to 
protest or complain about such actions. This is especially so as these complex electoral 
activities are organized within a short period of time and space,
6
 and most elections are 
conducted in an adversarial and trust-deficient environment.
7
 Elections also trigger disputes 
because they provide avenues for competition over the control of political power in a setting 
‘where the gains of a candidate constitute the losses of his/her opponent’.
8
 With these 
varieties of opportunity for stimulation, disputes usually pervade electoral processes.  
If efficient steps are not taken to prevent, manage or resolve electoral disputes, 
elections can have grave negative impacts on a polity. Unresolved electoral disputes stimulate 
apathy toward the electoral process. They kindle pessimism, which weakens commitment to 
the rule of law and undermines the credibility of elections and democratic governance.
9
 They 
also inhibit the support of stakeholders for the electoral system and engender the employment 
of objectionable strategies in influencing the outcomes of elections. Moreover, they trigger 
existing social grievances and escalate them into violence,
10
 which can create unfavourable 
impressions of the democratic process and destabilise the governance and peace of the polity. 
Such violence can degenerate into destruction of lives and property, and can also spill over 
                                                          
5
 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Electoral Security Framework Technical 
Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers (2010) 10. 
6
 WANEP op cit note 2. 
7
 Cheselden George V Carmona ‘Enhancing the capacity of judges to resolve election disputes: Preliminary 
considerations’ (2013) para 1, available at http://www.iojt-
dc2013.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/IOJT/11042013-Enhancing-Capacity-Judges-Resolve-Election-
Disputes.ashx, accessed on 2 August 2017, 
8
 WANEP op cit note 2. 
9
 Robert Dahl ‘Legal frameworks for effective election complaints adjudication systems’ in Chad Vickery (ed) 
Guidelines for Understanding, Adjudicating, and Resolving Disputes in Elections (GUARDE) (2011) 99. 
10
 Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) Preventing and Managing Violent Election-Related Conflicts in 




national borders and have adverse effects on neighbouring countries.
11
  Consequently, 
effective EDR is indispensable in all democracies, whether established or emerging. 
Acknowledging the role of EDR in the governance and stability of states, democratic 
states utilise various EDR models in resolving electoral disputes, based on their legal and 
political traditions.
12
 States such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy resolve 
electoral disputes through administrative and judicial bodies operating under special 
procedures.
13
 In Central America, South America, Eastern Europe and Greece, the 
jurisdiction for resolution of electoral disputes is vested in permanent electoral courts 
whereas in most developing countries electoral disputes are resolved by ordinary courts and 
special ad hoc tribunals.
14
  
The EDR models utilised by most states basically involve litigation which is argued to 
be inefficient in resolving most electoral disputes due to its adversarial character, procedural 
rigidity, time consumption, high cost implications, lack of confidentiality, and inability to 
identify and satisfy the interests of disputing parties.
15
  As a result, there is a trend towards 
the adoption of ADR in EDR. Available records on such adoption, for example in Africa, 




The stated benefits of ADR in EDR notwithstanding, the application of ADR in EDR 
is yet to be officially endorsed in Nigeria. The Nigerian EDR system is, therefore, currently 
litigation-based and bedevilled by the problems typically associated with litigation. 
Consequently, there have been calls for the adoption of ADR as a remedy to the problems of 
EDR in Nigeria.
17
 These calls appear reasonable considering the shortcomings of litigation 
and the recent research findings that post-election violence in Africa is mainly a consequence 
of the inefficiency of the current EDR systems rather than the failure of unsuccessful 
                                                          
11
 USAID op cit note 5 at 2. 
12
 Denis Petit Resolving Election Disputes in the OSCE Area: Towards a Standard Election Dispute Monitoring 






 Andrew I. Chukwuemerie ‘Necessity as the Mother of Trail blazing: Applying alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms to political party disputes in Africa’ (2009) 2 Journal of Politics and Law 121 at 124-6. 
16
 Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) Case Digest: Decisions of the IEBC Dispute 
Resolution Committee (2014) 7-8. 
17
 — Mohamed ‘Gov. Wike advocates Arbitration, ADR for electoral disputes’ Business Day 3 November 2016, 
available at https://www.businessdayonline.com/gov-wike-advocates-arbitration-and-adr-for-electoral-
disputes/, accessed on 27 November 2017; Joseph Onyekwere ‘LMDC advocates ADR for election disputes’ 
Guardian 6 June 2017, available at https://guardian.ng/features/lmdc-advocates-adr-for-election-disputes/, 




candidates to admit defeat.
18
 However, bearing in mind the socio-political configuration and 
peculiar features of electoral disputes in Nigeria, they stimulate questions regarding the 
functionality of ADR as an effective mechanism for the resolution of electoral disputes in the 
country.   
A review of the literature on the application of ADR in EDR in Nigeria reveals that 
not much research has been conducted on the subject. The literature reveals a consensus by 
researchers that the current Nigerian EDR system is inefficient and that there is need for a 
reform of the system. Also acknowledged — by researchers — are the merits of ADR and the 
necessity of its adoption as a response to the inefficiency of the Nigerian EDR system. Based 
on these premises, Chukwuemerie recommends the provision of a statutory framework for 
the application of ADR in EDR in Nigeria.
19
 Although he argues that, with the exception of 
election petitions, the application of ADR in EDR is not prohibited in Nigeria, 
Chukwuemerie maintains that a statutory framework, which expressly provides for the 
adoption of ADR in EDR, is essential to avoid unnecessary contentions over the applicability 
of ADR in such disputes.
20
 The statutory framework, he also posits, will enable ease of 
enforceability of outcomes and ensure the co-operation of disputants.
21
 Supporting the 
essentiality of a statutory framework, Uwazie asserts: 
[L]egislation will elevate the status of ADR before a sceptical disputant, will build public 
confidence, and will further increase ADR utilisation and promote ethical practice. 
Legislation will also provide a framework for reference, review and reform, as well as 
institutionalizing much needed education and professional training.
22
    
        These arguments are plausible. However, the provision of a statutory framework alone is 
insufficient to ensure the effective utilisation of ADR in EDR in Nigeria. The failure of some 
earlier attempted electoral reforms in Nigeria for which statutory frameworks were provided 
attests to this fact.
23
 Also, the recent reports of electoral violence and other vices associated 
with the 2017 Kenyan elections, despite the adoption of ADR in EDR in Kenya being 
constitutionally endorsed, indicate that more than a statutory framework is required for the 
                                                          
18
 O’Brien Kaaba The challenges of Adjudicating Presidential Election Disputes in Africa: Exploring the 
Viability of Establishing an African Supranational Elections Tribunal (LLD thesis, University of South Africa, 
2015) 122-3. 
19
 Chukwuemerie op cit note 15 at 127-32. 
20
 Ibid at 127. 
21
 Ibid at 131-2. 
22
 Ernest Uwazie (ed) Alternative Dispute Resolution and Peace-building in Africa (2014) 5. 
23
 For details of the reforms see Kehinde Bolaji ‘Toward institutionalizing credible elections in Nigeria: A 
review of reform measures by the Independent National Electoral Commission’ in Raul Cordenillo (ed) 




effective application of ADR in EDR.
24
 In fact, experience has shown that informal 
arrangements that do not have statutory support are sometimes accorded binding authority 
within the Nigerian political setting.
25
 This indicates that there are factors outside legal 
frameworks that influence the attitudes of political actors regarding compliance with rules. 
There is therefore a need for such factors to be identified and addressed, if a legal framework 
for the application of ADR must be complied with to achieve efficiency in the Nigerian EDR 
system. 
         Confirming the insufficiency of a legal framework in ensuring the effective utilisation 
of ADR, Uwazie identifies some key policy steps for the application and sustainability of 
ADR in Africa.
26
 These steps include investment in capacity-building through training and 
infrastructural support for ADR providers, the creation of appropriate incentives for lawyers 
and judges to adopt ADR, and the creation of synergy between formal/state ADR institutions 
and the informal/indigenous community sector and networks.
27
 Like the provision of a 
statutory framework, these steps are necessary for the application of ADR in EDR in Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, they are inadequate to ensure its efficiency. Although the training of ADR 
providers and the creation of synergy between the formal and informal sectors will equip 
ADR providers with some skills in the application of ADR and create more awareness about 
ADR, they cannot guarantee effective adoption and utilisation of ADR by the electorate if the 
factors — such as the value of political offices, abuse of power by political office holders, 
disregard for basic societal values, and corruption — which stimulate a sense of inequality 
and lack of confidence in the justice and electoral systems are not addressed. 
To achieve efficiency in the utilisation of ADR in EDR in Nigeria, the provision of a 
statutory framework, training of ADR practitioners and creation of synergy between the 
formal and informal ADR sectors must operate within an enabling environment, which 
safeguards the participation and confidence of disputants in the justice system. This is 
because ADR is primarily a voluntary process and, as such, is more attractive and adoptable 
when disputants perceive a reasonable level of equality or power balance that offers a 
                                                          
24
  Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010; Rael Ombuor and Kevin Sieff ‘At least 24 reportedly 
killed in post-election violence’ The Washington Post 12 August 2017, available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/at-least-24-reportedly-killed-in-kenya-post-election-
violence/2017/08/12/101b002c-7ef0-11e7-b2b1-aeba62854dfa_story.html?utm_term=.708701919b37, accessed 
on 21 August 2017. 
25
 Aminu Adamu Bello ‘Situating Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the political sphere: Thoughts on 
mechanisms for pre-election political dispute resolution in Nigeria’ (2009) 22. 
26






promise of fairness. The functionality of ADR as an efficient EDR mechanism in Nigeria is, 
therefore, a function of a combination of factors,
28
 some of which have been recommended in 
the literature, while some are yet to be identified or situated within the Nigerian EDR context. 
It is the unexplored aspects of the application of ADR in EDR in Nigeria that this dissertation 
addresses. 
1.3 Structure of the study 
Setting the stage for a good understanding of the application of ADR in EDR in Nigeria, 
chapter two describes the Nigerian electoral setting. It sets out some electoral trends and 
analyses the causes, classifications and manifestations of electoral disputes in Nigeria. Aside 
from disclosing the peculiar features of electoral disputes in Nigeria, which render the 
application of ADR necessary, the chapter demonstrates that the peculiarities of the Nigerian 
electoral setting impact the utilisation of ADR in EDR in Nigeria.     
Chapter three examines the impact of the current EDR legal framework and 
mechanism on the application of ADR in EDR in Nigeria. By reviewing the current EDR 
legal framework and the merits and demerits of the current officially adopted EDR 
mechanism, the chapter affords an understanding of the position of the law on the 
applicability of ADR in EDR in Nigeria. It also reveals the extent to which ADR can be a 
panacea to the inefficiency of the current EDR system in Nigeria. While affirming the 
necessity of ADR by disclosing the shortcomings of the current EDR mechanism, the chapter 
unveils the limits of ADR and some factors that can influence the efficiency of ADR in EDR 
in Nigeria.     
To appraise the utility and suitability of ADR in Nigeria, chapter four provides an 
overview of ADR and briefly reflects on its evolution and application in the resolution of 
disputes in Nigeria. The chapter also briefly undertakes a comparative analysis of trends in 
the adoption of ADR in EDR, to situate the utility and suitability of ADR within the EDR 
sphere. It further considers the merits and demerits of ADR in EDR with a view to assessing 
the viability of ADR in EDR within the Nigerian setting. 
The concluding chapter, which incorporates the findings and conclusions of this 
research, reveals the status of ADR as a tool for ameliorating inefficiency in the Nigerian 
                                                          
28
 Steven Gray and Linda Edgeworth ‘Complaints adjudication training for election management bodies and 





EDR system. While subscribing to the necessity of a reform of the current Nigerian EDR 
system, the chapter identifies some challenges that must be overcome for the adoption of 
ADR to be functional in EDR in Nigeria. In summary, it provides a roadmap for the 





ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL DISPUTES IN NIGERIA 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter, comprising four focal sections, unveils the peculiar features of the Nigerian 
electoral setting that impact the employment of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in 
Electoral Dispute Resolution (EDR). It shows that most electoral disputes in Nigeria are not 
over legitimate electoral rights but over parochial non-electoral interests and that the 
interests, when not carefully addressed, negatively impact entry into, and disposition to 
amicable resolution, of electoral disputes.  
The first section lays the foundation for the chapter by providing an overview of the 
Nigerian socio-political setting and how manipulation of the setting by some politicians is the 
underlying cause of most electoral disputes in Nigeria. The second section reveals the 
motivation for this unhealthy manipulation. It traces the causes of some of the disputes to the 
underlying cause disclosed in the first section while linking some to defective structural and 
institutional foundations. The third and fourth sections respectively consider the 
classifications and manifestations of electoral disputes in Nigeria with a view to aiding 
understanding of the trajectories and complexity of electoral disputes and their impact on the 
efficiency of ADR in EDR in Nigeria. 
2.2 The Nigerian electoral setting  
Before colonisation by the British, the different ethnic groups in the political entity now 
known as Nigeria were separately governed under diverse well-established traditional 
political institutions, with different religious orientations.
29
 Allegiance to governance was 
primarily ethnic-based and the methods of accession to political offices were traditional and 
peculiar to the groups.
30
 During colonisation, the pre-existing political and religious 
institutions were significantly destabilised. However, they were not totally abolished as the 
indirect rule system enabled their survival to some extent.
31
 As a result, allegiance along 
ethno-religious lines was maintained after the amalgamation of the country in 1914. This, 
coupled with hostilities between the ethnic groups, encouraged by the British through their 
                                                          
29









‘divide and rule’ style of governance, led to the transfer of ethno-religious sentiments to 
elections into the British-introduced political offices in Nigeria.
32
 
The three major political parties in Nigeria during the colonial era were ethnically 
aligned.
33
 While the Action Group (AG) was Yoruba-dominated, the Northern People’s 
Congress (NPC) was Hausa/Fulani-dominated, and the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (later Nigerian Citizens) was Ibo-dominated.
34
 By 1960 when the country gained 
independence, the desire to gain advantage in federal elections prompted political parties to 
expand their membership composition and focus.
35
 This shift in political party configuration 
was reinforced by electoral reforms, from 1979 onward, which led to constitutional 
requirements for a country-wide presence and membership composition of political parties.
36
 
As such, there are no strictly ethnic or region-based political parties in Nigeria. 
Notwithstanding, the ethno-religious factor still plays a prominent role in Nigerian 
elections.
37
 This situation is chiefly due to the avaricious disposition of some politicians and 
the fact that the political parties are usually not formed based on distinctive political 
ideologies but on parochial interests, which endorse ethno-religious affiliations.
38
 
A significant consequence of the resort to ethno-religious affiliations for electoral 
advantage is the transfer of the interests and sentiments of the groups to the electoral process. 
Elections therefore become a competition between the groups, and not merely between the 
candidates or political parties.
39
 In the process, pre-existing non-electoral group disputes are 
stirred and merged with electoral disputes. As a result, it is difficult to separate electoral 
disputes from ethnic, communal or religious disputes in Nigeria.
40
 During the 2003, 2007 and 
2011 presidential elections, for example, the North/South and Christian/Muslim diversities 
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were highlighted and merged with electoral processes.
41
 On the 2011 presidential elections in 
particular, Odusote argues that ethno-religious interests impacted the attitude of voters.
42
 
Reports also disclose that post-election violence erupted when the election results indicated 
that a Muslim/Northerner had lost the election to a Christian/Southerner.
43
 These indicate the 
extent to which non-electoral interests are fused with elections in Nigeria. 
Merging group interests with the electoral process escalates the electoral stakes and 
exacerbates the group disputes in the electoral process. It causes such disputes to degenerate 
into electoral violence when not properly managed or resolved.
44
 For instance, during the 
1964 general election, large-scale post-election violence associated with ethnic alignment of 
political parties and the exacerbation of contest over national census results by the regions 
was recorded.
45
 It is also on record that all the subsequent general elections in Nigeria (1979, 
1983, 1993, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015) occasioned grave violence.
46
 According to 
reports, about 1000 lives were lost during the 1965-66 Western Regional election violence 
while the 2011 election violence claimed more than 800 lives.
47
 In view of these experiences, 
elections in Nigeria are considered synonymous with violence.
48
 
Another consequence of the employment of ethno-religious sentiments in elections is 
the inhibition of dedication to the rule of law.
49
 When electoral stakes are escalated through 
the transfer of group interests, parties tend to employ various strategies to outwit opponents. 
In the process, rules of fairness and transparency are usually jettisoned,
50
 and some 
politicians fail ‘to adhere to the basic principles of democracy and constitutionalism’.
51
 This 
failure is manifested through various corrupt practices, including the abuse of the power of 
incumbency and failure to adequately fund election management bodies. The overwhelming 
influence of political ‘godfathers’ and the failure of political parties to conduct or abide by 
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the results of party primary elections are also part of the practices. So too are the lack of 
political will to enforce electoral laws, inordinate manipulation of the media, oppression of 
the opposition, undue influence of officials, and failure to prosecute electoral offenders. 
These practices have been exhibited by some politicians in the country at various points.
52
 
The utilisation of ethno-religious sentiments in elections also infests the electoral 
environment with distrust and acrimony. These lead to frivolous allegations, avoidable 
disputes and high-volume litigation. The number of election-related cases filed in courts and 
tribunals in the country attests to the enormity of the situation. For instance, the number of 
petitions filed at the election tribunals after the 2007 and 2011 general elections were 1, 290 
and 731 respectively.
53
 An addition of the number of pre-election matters filed in regular 
courts to these petitions discloses an alarming litigious electoral setting. In the 2007 elections, 
for instance, it is claimed that the number of cases filed in the electoral cycle was 6 180.
54
 
The report on the 2011 elections also shows that several political parties filed multiple 
appeals.
55
 It is therefore not surprising that elections in Nigeria are regarded as being 
‘coterminous with brinkmanship and legal fireworks’.
56
 Such legal fireworks exert enormous 
pressure on the judiciary, occasioning inefficiency in justice delivery.
57
 
In addition to the exploitation of ethno-religious sentiments, elections in Nigeria are 
infused with exorbitant funds which, according to Odusote, determine the choice of candidate 
and largely influence the outcome of the elections.58 The infusion of funds also induces some 
electorates and electoral officers to engage in corrupt practices, especially considering the 
rate of unemployment and poverty in the country.
59
 Thus, it undermines the electoral process. 
The drive for the exploitation of ethno-religious sentiments and the huge investment 
in elections in Nigeria is not farfetched: the economic, political and social value of political 
offices is unduly high. From available records, an Indian legislator will have to work for 49 
years, a Swedish Senator for 12 years, an American senator for eight years, and an American 
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president for three years to earn the annual salary of a Nigerian Senator.
60
 In fact, it is 
categorically asserted that Nigerian politicians are the highest paid in the world.
61
 Besides 
remuneration, political office offers enormous power, high social status and access to state 
resources. When such values are attached to political offices in a country with a high level of 
unemployment, poor remuneration for legitimate workers and lack of infrastructure, nothing 
less than a fierce electoral competition can be the result. In explaining the crisis of electoral 
governance in Nigeria, Jinadu alludes to this fact as follows: 
This partly explains why Nigerian electoral politics has over the years increasingly assumed 
violent, war-like forms…. It is also why no effort has historically been spared by partisans 
across party lines to subvert the electoral process…. It has turned politics into a huge business 
enterprise, where rules designed to ensure the indeterminacy of elections are openly and 
crassly violated, and where regulators become active or inactive collaborators in the grand 
larceny of the people’s electoral mandate.
62
 
The value of the political offices exudes injustice and inequality, considering the rate 
of unemployment and other employees’ remuneration. As such, it provokes misgivings, 
disloyalty to the government, and reasonable but avoidable disputes, thereby undermining 
progressive socio-political transformation. As Ziblatt writes, reflecting on nineteenth century 
Germany:  
While the political equality offered by universal, equal, direct suffrage was, and continues to 
be, regarded as potentially transformative, its impact is conditional and can be diminished if 
introduced into settings marked by stark socioeconomic inequalities and steep social 




The value of political office is, therefore, a critical factor in electoral processes and 
disputes in Nigeria.  Apart from engendering the exploitation of ethno-religious sentiments 
and other objectionable strategies in elections, it escalates the electoral stakes and negatively 
influences entry into and exit from electoral disputes. The more value-oriented the electoral 
stakes are or the more weight is attached to the values, the more difficult the refrain from 
dispute or a positive response to dispute resolution would be, and vice versa.
64
 Moreover, the 
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influence and perceived expectations of exploited groups on the immediate disputants affects 
attitudes towards disputes and dispute resolution.
65
 In essence therefore, the value of political 
office has substantial impact on the adoption and efficiency of ADR in EDR in Nigeria. 
2.3 Causes of electoral disputes in Nigeria  
Electoral disputes in Nigeria are often provoked and driven by underlying factors, most of 
which are not directly related to the electoral process.
66
 Aside from such factors, there are 
other factors that directly stir and provide venting routes for the underlying causes of 
electoral disputes in Nigeria. These factors are multifarious and erratic, especially due to the 
multi-cultural and socio-political setting of the country. Consequently, an exhaustive 
discussion on the factors is beyond the allowance of this work and is not claimed. 
Nevertheless, some of these factors that are routine and have considerable impact on the 
electoral process are discussed in this section. 
 A notable dispute generator in elections in Nigeria is lack of respect by politicians for 
basic societal and electoral values. Disregard for the rules of fairness and transparency, 
overwhelming influence of political ‘godfathers’, and the failure of political parties to 
conduct party primaries or abide by the result of such primaries commonly feature during 
elections in Nigeria.
67
 Such undemocratic practices are contrary to the basic values of the 
society and expectations of the electorates. When such practices are employed in elections, 
dissatisfaction over perceived insensitivity and violation is enflamed and disputes therefore 
arise.
68
 As succinctly noted in a report: 
An election is a value-based social experience. It is based on the understanding that the best 
way to rule a society is through popular consent. It is therefore required that those 
participating in politics would recognize and work within the ambit of this value. Disputes 
arise when politicians or their supporters are opposed to the basic value of an election, most 
especially the rule of law. In many cases, African politics is threatened by the various forms 
of undemocratic values that people seek to bring into political participation, including 
ethnicity, religion and gender bias. The matter is more compounded when the politicians 
themselves are not bound together by any sane political ideology; and though they belong to 
the same party there is bound to be clash of interest resulting into disputes.
69
 
There are numerous court cases that exemplify disputes over such lack of respect for basic 
societal and electoral values. One such case is Amaechi vs INEC,
70
 where Rt Hon Chibuike 
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Amaechi, who won the PDP primary election for the 2007 Rivers State Governorship 
election, was unlawfully substituted with Celestine Omehia as the candidate of the party. 
Cases based on similar facts include Dalhatu v Turaki,
71
 and Ugwu v Ararume.
72
   
The abuse of the power of incumbency by political office holders is also a common 
electoral dispute activator in Nigeria. Regarding the 2015 general elections, for instance, it 
was reported that the elections were marred by the ‘abuse of incumbency at state and federal 
levels’.
73
 The position is not different in other elections, and it manifests in diverse ways such 
as unlawfully dismissing from office political office holders who belong to opposition 
political parties,
74
 depriving opposition political parties of the right to use public facilities,
75
 
and manipulation of government broadcasting institutions against opposition parties
76
. Such 
practices generate disputes by creating a sense of injustice and dissatisfaction which can have 
dire consequences on the electoral process if not properly resolved.  
Similarly, the simple majority or first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system and 
winner-takes-all politics adopted in Nigeria generate electoral disputes by giving enormous 
power to the winners of elections while giving no incentives for losers to accept defeat.
77
 By 
creating huge difference between winners and losers, they generate perceptions of exclusion 
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and injustice in the polity. These, especially in societies that are ethnically or otherwise 
divided, lead to electoral disputes.78 
Poor governance, the extravagant lifestyles of politicians, and lack of accountability 
by political office holders also trigger electoral disputes because they generate and reinforce 
public perceptions of injustice and inequality in the distribution of public resources. Such 
perceptions motivate some underprivileged electorates to form an alliance with opposition 
candidates and political parties to employ unwholesome strategies to effect a change of 
government and redistribution of wealth.
79
 
Electoral disputes also arise from the ‘do or die’ attitude of some politicians.
80
 Due to 
the socio-economic value of political offices, some politicians — as strategies to remain in 
political offices or gain political favour and access to political offices — deliberately and 
maliciously provoke disputes through defamation, slander and vote rigging.
81
 Some go as far 
as using intimidation, thuggery, abduction and assassination of political opponents to achieve 
their selfish political ambitions.
82




 The information provided by the media also generates electoral disputes.
84
 Disputes 
ensue when the media are used by politicians to disseminate biased or politically-motivated 
opinions about some sensitive issues, or to spread slanderous and defamatory information 
about their opponents.
85
 In an electoral climate that is routinely hostile, such media reportage 
gain rapid traction and provokes reaction. Conversely, failure to provide appropriate 
information induces disputes by the negative perception it provokes.
86
 For instance, reports 
on the 2015 general elections disclosed that ‘government-controlled media failed to provide 
legally-required equal coverage, clearly advantaging incumbents’.
87
 Such perception of 
‘advantaging’ the opponent triggers electoral disputes. 
The inefficient design of elections also triggers electoral disputes. Such disputes are 
common where the political, institutional and legal frameworks regulating elections seem to 
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create an unbalanced platform for competition or make provisions that are not in tune with 
the socio-political realities of the polity. For example, the limitations on the financial and 
administrative autonomy of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) have 
been a matter of serious concern in Nigeria as they result in irregularities, such as delay in the 
procurement and distribution of election materials during elections.
88
 The provision for the 
assumption of political offices, while petitions on the validity of the election or return of 
candidates are still pending, has also generated fierce controversies and dissatisfaction in 
Nigeria, as it is considered to give undue advantage to returned candidates.
89
  
Similarly, inefficient management of elections provoke electoral disputes. Attributed 
to factors like inadequate funding, lack of financial and administrative autonomy, corruption 
and incompetence of some staff of the INEC,
90
 the inefficiency manifests in a variety of 
ways, including procedural irregularities, logistical blunders, poor election schedules, and 
non-compliance with electoral laws. In some cases the errors are insignificant. In others, 
however, they are significant and stimulate disputes.
91
 In Agagu v Mimiko,
92
 for example, the 
election of Agagu was challenged on grounds of electoral malpractices and irregularities.  
Perceived inefficiency, bias and corruption of the judiciary and law enforcement 
agents have also been known to stimulate electoral disputes. When victims of electoral 
wrongs receive little or no redress because relevant authorities fail to enforce the laws, they 
are dissatisfied with the system and disputes consequently arise.
93
 For instance, the 1964-65 
post-election violence in Western Nigeria is attributed to dissatisfaction over the 
imprisonment of Chief Awolowo whose ‘supporters believe should have been the right leader 
to govern the affairs of Nigeria but for the decision of the court’.
94
  
These causes of electoral disputes can have serious negative impacts on the adoption 
and effective application of ADR in EDR if not properly handled because some of the basic 
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attractions of ADR are the sense of control and bargaining equality that disputants have in the 
process. Where such incentives are absent due to significant power imbalance between the 
disputants as a result of corruption or the abuse of power of incumbency, a positive 
disposition to dispute resolution will be lacking. Similarly, in an environment with flagrant 
disregard for the rule of law, disputants will be deterred from dispute resolution processes as 
they would be exercises in futility. This is more so where there is a serious public perception 
of injustice and inequality due to the value of political offices; there will be no moral or 
rational justification and incentive to adopt amicable methods of settlement whilst such 
disabling factors are intact.  Accordingly, for ADR to be an efficient mechanism in EDR in 
Nigeria, these factors must be properly addressed. 
2.4 Classifications of electoral disputes in Nigeria 
Electoral disputes can be classified in a variety of ways, for example, based on the type of 
issue in question, the stage of the electoral process at which it arises, or the type of parties 
involved. Regarding the type of issue in question, the classifications include registration, 
eligibility, nomination, party primaries, accreditation, voting, and return of candidate.  
Based on the stage of the electoral process, electoral disputes in Nigeria can broadly 
be categorised into three: pre-election, election and post-election disputes. Pre-election 
disputes are election-related disputes that arise at the preliminary stage of the electoral 
process, before the election day. They include disputes regarding election schedules, political 
party registration, voter registration, political party primaries, nomination of candidates, 
substitution of candidates, disqualification of candidates, electioneering campaigns, and the 
publication of requisite election notices. For instance, in Amaechi vs INEC,
95
 the issue before 
the court was whether the substitution of the candidacy of Amaechi by the PDP was valid. In 
Action Congress v INEC,
96
 the issue was whether INEC has the powers to disqualify a party’s 
nominated candidate.  
Election disputes are disputes which relate to irregularities in the course of an election 
—from the accreditation of voters to the declaration of results. The majority of these disputes 
are grievances regarding the validity of elections or return of candidates. They include the 
qualification of candidates to contest election, exclusion of candidates from contesting an 
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election, and compliance of elections with legal requirements.
97
 These disputes are statutorily 
required to be resolved by petition only, filed within a specified period in the court of appeal 
and election tribunals in the country.
98
  
Post-election disputes are electoral disputes that arise after the return of candidates. 
They include grievances over the tenure of office of political office holders,
99
 vacancy of 
political offices,
100
 and review of political parties’ expenses.
101
 In Peter Obi v INEC,
102
 for 
instance, the court was called upon to determine when the tenure of office of a governor 
begins. In Abubakar v AGF,
103
 the issue before the court was whether the purported 
declaration of the vacancy of the office of the Vice-President, by the President, before the 
expiration of the statutory tenure was valid. 
Regarding the parties involved, electoral disputes in Nigeria are classified into inter-
personal, intra-party and inter-party disputes.
104
 To these can be added a fourth category, 
which can be termed ‘composite’ electoral disputes. Inter-personal electoral disputes are 
election-related personal disputes between two or more persons who may or may not be 
members of the same political party. The persons involved are usually influential leaders with 
a large followership. Consequently, their personal interests and disputes determine the 
attitude of others and create a chain of disputes which considerably impact electoral 
processes. One example of this type of dispute is the dispute between former President 
Obasanjo and Vice-President Atiku over the presidency of the country in the 2007 
elections.
105
 The incompatible personal ambitions of the two politicians to occupy the 
political office led to several legal tussles, even involving INEC and the federal 
government.
106
 Another example is the dispute between Rt Hon Chibuike Amaechi and 
Governor Nyesom Wike, which is still affecting citizens and governance of Rivers State,
107
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though it is basically about the conflicting personal ambitions of the erstwhile political allies 
to control the politics of Rivers State
108
. 
Intra-party electoral disputes are election-related disputes between members of the 
same political party. Such disputes, in Nigeria, usually arise due to distrust, indiscipline and 
lack of internal democracy in the political parties. These disputes manifest in various ways, 
including litigations and defections. Examples include the case of Amaechi v INEC,
109
 and 
the defections of some PDP governors to APC before the 2015 general elections.
110
 
Inter-party electoral disputes are election-related disputes between two or more 
political parties. They are ordinarily non-personal disputes over the interests of political 
parties. However, due to the mode of party formations in Nigeria, where the interests of 
political parties are usually embedded in the interests of a few politicians, disputes regarding 
the personal interests of such politicians commonly translate to inter- party disputes. The 
diverse disputes between the political parties fall in this category, with many of them 
typically metamorphosing into composite electoral disputes.  
Composite electoral disputes are electoral disputes involving varied issues between 
diverse kinds of parties, without a strict line of demarcation. The dispute may involve a 
combination of political parties, individuals, INEC and other institutions. It may also relate to 
a variety or combination of issues including nominations of candidates, substitution of 
candidates, security, the election timetable and infringement of rights. The majority of the 
electoral disputes in Nigeria fall within this category, though they often begin as any of the 
three other categories. The case of APC v PDP & 4ors,
111
 which involved two political 
parties, the INEC, an individual, the Chief of Defence Staff, and the Inspector-General of 
Police, typifies this class of electoral dispute.   
The trajectories and interconnectedness of the various categories of electoral disputes 
indicate that electoral disputes in Nigeria are not stand-alone, linear disputes that can properly 
be resolved between the immediate parties without consideration of the interests and 
influence of unrepresented but significant parties. To be an effective mechanism in EDR 
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therefore, ADR must be well-designed to accommodate the complexities and inclusiveness of 
interests and influences in electoral disputes.   
2.5 Manifestations of electoral disputes 
Dissatisfaction with electoral processes can manifest in a range of behaviours, including voter 
apathy, debates, complaints, protests, defections, boycotts, litigations and violence. As the 
form of manifestation is determined by a variety of factors, including the personalities and 
backgrounds of the parties, the cause(s) of the dispute, the extent of external influence on the 
immediate parties, and the attitude of the government, dissatisfaction may be perceived easily 
in some circumstances, whereas it may be difficult to decipher in other circumstances. 
Voter apathy is a lack of enthusiasm by the electorate in the electoral process. It is a 
restrained but common manifestation of electoral disputes in Nigeria.
112
 It usually occurs 
when individuals, due to their disillusionment with previous poorly managed elections or 
over the inability to obtain redress for previous electoral wrongs, lack confidence in the 
electoral system and refrain from participating in electoral processes.
113
 The refrain is not an 
indication of the acceptance of the system or lack of interest in redressing perceived wrongs 
but a display of disregard and lack of support for the electoral system. In many instances, 
therefore, it is accompanied by overt behaviours that undermine the credibility of the 
electoral process and the legitimacy of the resultant government. 
Debates are spirited arguments of divergent views on electoral issues. They are 
ordinarily non-violent, yet clear manifestations of discontent with particular aspects of the 
electoral process. Debates are conducted through diverse modes including oral, written and 
mass media presentations, and made at different stages of the electoral process. During the 
2015 general elections, for instance, there were heated debates in various forms and at 
different stages of the electoral process over the use of Smart Card Readers and the 
rescheduling of the elections.
114
 
Aggrieved parties sometimes show their grievances by lodging complaints with 
relevant authorities. A complaint is a formal and clear expression of discontent by an 
aggrieved party, lodged with an institution that is legally empowered to redress the alleged 
wrong. Instances abound where complaints displayed dissatisfaction during elections in 
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Nigeria. One such complaint arose during the 2015 general elections where a candidate of the 
People for Democratic Change (PDC) party petitioned INEC, calling for the prosecution of 




Protest is another method employed by aggrieved parties to display displeasure with 
electoral processes. It is a collective demonstration of disapproval by numerous parties who 
share a common grievance about a particular issue(s). It is typical in Nigerian elections and 
may be peaceful or violent. For instance, a peaceful protest was staged by Edo state youths on 
15 October 2016 at the INEC headquarters in Abuja, following the controversy that trailed 
the Edo state governorship election.
116
 By contrast, the protest over the 2011 presidential 
election result was violent and led to over 800 deaths and loss of property.
117
   
Defection is also a common means of expressing discontent in the Nigerian electoral 
setting. It is the transfer of allegiance from one political party to another and frequently 
occurs following intra-party disputes. An example is the defection of several governors from 
PDP to APC before the 2015 general elections.
118
 
Political parties or groups sometimes register grievances by boycotting elections. The 
essence of a boycott is to undermine the legitimacy of elections or effect significant changes 
in the electoral process by refraining from participation in the electoral process. Boycott is 
not a common occurrence in Nigeria but has been adopted on some occasions. In 1964, for 




Litigation is another method of registering discontent with electoral processes in 
Nigeria. It entails seeking redress in courts of law or election tribunals. As exemplified by the 
volume of election-related suits and petitions filed in the courts and election tribunals, 
litigation is a common manifestation of electoral disputes in Nigeria. It is apparently the most 
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utilised method, maybe because it is overt, regulated and supported by the coercive powers of 
the judiciary. 
The variation in the modes of manifesting electoral disputes indicates that, while 
some disputants can be identified easily, some may be difficult to identify. Accordingly, 
whereas direct and specific ADR sessions may be appropriate for the resolution of some 
disputes, some disputes may require indirect approaches, such as good governance, positive 
legislative approaches or extensive consultations outside the electoral sector. To be an 
effective mechanism in EDR therefore, ADR must be designed to accommodate such 
nuances. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Electoral disputes in Nigeria are basically caused by the exorbitant value of Nigerian 
political offices, which propels the employment of objectionable strategies, particularly the 
exploitation of ethno-religious sentiments and disregard for democratic practices, in electoral 
processes.
120
 The value of political offices and the motivated strategies influence the 
commencement, form, manifestation, and attitude of disputants to the resolution of electoral 
disputes. Consequently, for ADR to be an effective mechanism in EDR in Nigeria the value 
of political offices must be properly reviewed and ADR processes must be designed to suit 
the intricacies of electoral disputes within the Nigerian context.
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CURRENT ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
AND MECHANISM IN NIGERIA 
3.1 Introduction 
In its three main sections, this chapter examines the current Electoral Dispute Resolution 
(EDR) legal framework and mechanism in Nigeria, with a view to detailing their implications 
on the utilisation of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in EDR in Nigeria. Whereas the 
first section reviews the position of the law on the applicability of ADR in EDR in Nigeria, 
the second and third sections respectively consider the merits and demerits of litigation in 
EDR. These three sections shed light on some factors that impact the adoption and efficiency 
of litigation and may also impact the application of ADR in EDR in Nigeria. 
3.2 The Legal framework for EDR in Nigeria  
Nigeria operates a federal system of government. Accordingly, there are diversities and 
concurrences of legislative jurisdiction between the federal and state governments.
121
 On 
election matters, the National Assembly has exclusive jurisdiction to legislate on the conduct 
of the Presidential, Vice-Presidential, National Assembly, Governorship, Deputy-
Governorship, State Houses of Assembly and the Federal Capital Territory Area Council 
elections, whereas it has concurrent jurisdiction with the State Houses of Assembly to 
legislate on Local Government Council elections.
122
 Consequently, there are differences 
between the laws regulating the elections regarding which the National Assembly has 
exclusive legislative jurisdiction and the laws regulating the Local Government Council 
elections regarding which it has concurrent legislative jurisdiction. In line with the focus of 
this research, however, discussion is based on the legal framework regulating the elections 
over which the National Assembly has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. 
The resolution of electoral disputes in Nigeria is principally regulated by the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and the Electoral Act of 
2010 (as amended). However, there are supplementary legal instruments regulating EDR. 
These include the Election Tribunal and Court Practice Directions of 2011, the Evidence Act 
18 of 2011, the Criminal Code Act,
123
 the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act,
124
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the Penal Code (Northern States) Federal Provisions Act,
125
 and the Administration of 
Criminal Justice Act, 2015. In addition, as the Nigerian legal system is based on English 
common law, case law also regulates EDR in Nigeria. 
By the provision of section 239 (1) of the Constitution, the Court of Appeal is vested 
with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any question as to whether- 
(a) Any person has been validly elected to the office of President or Vice-President 
under the Constitution; 
(b) The term of office of the President or Vice-President has ceased; or 
(c) The office of President or Vice-President has become vacant. 
Under section 285(1) of the Constitution, the National Assembly Election Tribunals have 
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine petitions as to whether- 
(a) Any person has been validly elected as a member of the National Assembly; 
(b) The term of office of any person under the Constitution has ceased; 
(c) The seat of a member of the House of Representatives has become vacant; or 
(d) A question or petition brought before the election tribunal has been properly or 
improperly brought. 
Whereas the Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunals, under section 185(2) 
of the Constitution, respectively have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine 
petitions as to whether any person has been validly elected to the office of Governor or 
Deputy Governor or as a member of any legislative house, the Area Council Election 
Tribunals have the exclusive original jurisdiction, under section 135(1) of the Electoral Act, 
to hear and determine any question as to whether- 
(a) Any person has been validly elected to the office of Chairman, Vice-Chairman or 
Councillor; 
(b) The term of office of any person elected to the office of Chairman, Vice-Chairman 
or Councillor has ceased; 
(c) The seat of a member of the Area Council has become vacant; or 
(d) A question or petition brought before the Area Council Election Tribunal has been 
properly or improperly brought. 
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Based on the above constitutional provisions and the provision of section 133(1) of 
the Electoral Act,
126
 disputes over the validity of the election of a person to any political 
office, the termination of the tenure of office of any political office holder, the vacancy of any 
political office, and the propriety or impropriety of any question or petition brought before 
the election tribunals can only be resolved through litigation in the appropriate court or 
tribunal. In other words, the law clearly precludes the application of ADR in the resolution of 
such disputes in Nigeria. 
Regarding other electoral disputes however, there are no express legal provisions on 
the manner or forum for resolution.
127
 This lack of clear guidance, especially where the law 
has expressly made provisions for the above stated aspects, seems to suggest that it is the 
intention of the legislature that the disputing parties should make the choice of resolution 
methods and fora that are best suited to them. In support of this position, Chukwuemerie 
asserts that the judicial jurisdictions vested in the courts are not intended to compel disputants 
to submit disputes to the courts but to regulate the jurisdiction of the courts in the resolution 
of disputes when submitted to the courts.
128
 This assertion debunks arguments that may be 
raised by virtue of sections 6, 251 and 272 of the Constitution, which vest the judicial powers 
of the Federation and exclusive jurisdictions over certain causes in the courts. In other words, 
there is currently no constitutional or statutory provision in Nigeria that precludes the 
resolution of other electoral disputes by ADR.  
The above legal argument notwithstanding, in Nigeria the resolution of disputes by 
methods other than litigation is generally subject to public policy considerations.
129
 The 
application of ADR in electoral disputes in Nigeria is, therefore, subject to permissibility by 
Nigerian public policy. Commenting on the permissibility, Chukwuemerie maintains that 
with the exception of very few disputes, such as crimes and matrimonial causes, that are 
restricted from arbitrability under the common law, all other disputes, including electoral 
disputes, are arbitrable and, as such, resolvable by ADR.
130
 This implies that, apart from 
electoral offences that are not compoundable
131
 under the Nigerian law or any electoral 
dispute that is otherwise precluded from non-litigious resolution by Nigerian public policy, 
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ADR can be utilised in the resolution of any electoral dispute that is not expressly prohibited 
from non-litigious resolution under the stated provisions.  
Although the utilisation of ADR in EDR is not precluded under the Nigerian law, 
EDR in Nigeria is currently litigation-based. This, it may be argued, is because there is no 
legal framework that enables the application of ADR in EDR. The Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act
132
 only applies to commercial disputes, and there is no federal statute 
regulating mediation and negotiation in Nigeria. It therefore appears that the lack of provision 
for the application of ADR in the resolution of electoral disputes informs the choice of 
litigation in EDR. However, the fact that the choice is made when there is no prescription for 
the adoption of litigation or the preclusion of ADR in the resolution of the disputes — 
exception of the above stated — indicates that the choice is informed by factors other than 
legal provision.  
One factor which informs a litigious approach is the adoption of an acrimonious 
culture. It is primarily stimulated by the socio-economic value of political offices and 
misconception of the essence of political office. Probably due to the value of political offices, 
some politicians conceive political offices as avenues for wealth acquisition instead of public 
service.
133
 They therefore value political offices above societal cohesion and a relationship 
with the electorate. Gaining access to political office then becomes a goal they strive to 
achieve at all costs, even when it is inimical to the general good.
134
 As a result, they jettison 
the cherished African values of peace, reconciliation and societal harmony in exchange for 
the culture of acrimony and discord. Accordingly, a mechanism that can afford the 
achievement of the goal without consideration of other non-legal interests appears more 
attractive than a mechanism that will consider other interests or require apologies, reparation 
or accountability to ensure reconciliation, relationships and societal cohesion. Since litigation 
fits this model of dispute settlement, it becomes preferable to ADR. 
Another explanation for the adoption of litigation is a disregard for ADR and lack of 
trust in ADR practitioners. In pre-colonial Africa, ADR was a popular and highly valued 
system of dispute resolution.
135
 However, with the subversion of African traditional systems 
                                                          
132
 CAP A18 LFN 2004. 
133




 Jude C Onyeche ‘Repositioning the African customary system: A case study of Traditional Dispute 
Resolution mechanism in Nigeria’ in Victor E Nweke (ed) Adjudication and other Strategies of Conflict 




and the introduction of British-oriented litigation by the colonialists, the regard that ADR 
once enjoyed in Nigeria was whittled away. The traditional structures which supported the 
application of ADR were destabilised and average educated Nigerians were trained and 
brainwashed to disregard ADR.
136
 In addition, some surviving traditional ADR administering 
systems were politicised, resulting in the partisanship of some of its practitioners and lack of 
trust in the systems.
137
 Resultantly, ADR and the traditional systems that administer it are 
disregarded in preference for litigation.  
Indiscipline and lack of trust among politicians also account for recourse to litigation 
in EDR in Nigeria. Some politicians are undisciplined and do not keep promises.
138
 They are, 
therefore, not trustworthy. Consequently, it does not appear reasonable to engage with them 
in non-binding settlements, since such efforts may be exercises in futility. To ensure 
enforcement of electoral dispute resolution outcomes, therefore, litigation, which offers 
legally-backed coercive enforcement, becomes an attractive mechanism. 
3.3 The merits of litigation in EDR   
One of the attractions of litigation is the coercive power of the court or tribunal to 
enforce its orders and decisions. The court has power to compel parties and witnesses to 
attend proceedings and to tender evidence. It also has powers to enforce its decisions and 
punish those who fail to comply with its decisions.
139
 There were instances where election 
tribunals in Nigeria compelled the production of documents by threat of a jail term.
140
 They 
have also stalled attempts by counsel and parties to unnecessarily delay trials.
141
 Thus, 
litigation helps to maintain discipline in the electoral setting. This feature of litigation is 
advantageous, considering records of indiscipline and abuse of power by some politicians and 
electoral officers. Without such coercive powers, the EDR system would be total chaos.  
The public performance of the role of judges instils a perception of the impartiality 
and neutrality of the judiciary. As court proceedings and decisions are public and can be 
observed by interested parties, the suspicion of undue influence by either disputant is largely 
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dispelled. This, coupled with the fact that the proceedings are conducted in line with pre-
determined rules, promotes confidence in the justice system and aids acceptance and 
compliance with judicial decisions.
142
 Records indicate that most disputants accept and 
voluntarily comply with judicial decisions on electoral disputes in Nigeria, though there have 
been instances of non-compliance with some court orders.
143
 
 Conducting legal proceedings according to pre-determined rules also enables 
consistency and fairness in the determination of cases by minimising undue influence and the 
subjectivity of the umpire.
144
 It aids protection of the rights of the disadvantaged and inspires 
confidence in the EDR system. These merits are crucial in the electoral setting considering 
the typical power imbalances and suspicions among parties. 
Litigation also ensures the preservation of public values.
145
 The judicial officers are 
public officials, appointed through formal processes and public participation. Their authority 
and roles are determined by law, and their allegiance is ordinarily to the state. This, aside 
from instilling confidence by enabling the neutrality of the officers, ensures the preservation 
of public values by imposing an obligation on judicial officers to interpret and enforce legal 
provisions that reflect public values. Thus, litigation helps to maintain reasonable general 
standards and equality, which facilitate peace and harmony in the polity. The importance of 
this merit in EDR cannot be overemphasised. The power imbalances in the electoral setting 
and the egocentric disposition of some politicians in the pursuit of political offices necessitate 
the maintenance of such standards and equality.  
The publicity of litigation enables the development of law by permitting observation 
and valuable response from the public. It also creates awareness of legal requirements in 
electoral matters. This potentially minimises non-compliance with the law and inspires 
confidence in the judicial and electoral systems. Where the disputes are properly settled, 
susceptible minds may be deterred from engaging in electoral wrongs, whereas the 
confidence of victims of electoral wrongs may conversely be inspired. 
Another merit of litigation is the availability of appeal. This promotes justice by 
providing opportunities for disputes to be determined at different levels and by diverse 
neutrals. Such opportunities minimise the possibility of undue influence that may be likely 
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where only one arbiter is involved in the resolution of disputes. Besides, though it is time 
consuming, the opportunity permits the correction of judicial errors or the affirmation of the 
decisions of the lower courts. There are numerous instances in Nigeria where the decisions of 
lower courts and tribunals were affirmed on appeal and other instances where they were set 
aside on grounds of error.
146
 The corrections and affirmations stimulate a sense of justice, 
which boosts confidence in the justice system and stability in the polity.  
Although litigation offers these merits, there are setbacks in its efficiency in EDR in 
Nigeria. A contributory factor to this is corruption and perceived lack of neutrality and 
impartiality of judges. According to Omenma et al, most court decisions in election matters in 
Nigeria are tainted with corruption because ‘the courts have become targets of “political 
investors” while justice becomes auctionable’.
147
 It is also on record that some judges were 
indicted and some dismissed on grounds of corruption.
148
 Public confidence in the judiciary 
has therefore declined over the years.
149
 Interestingly, however, it is argued that reforms in 




One lesson from this setback is that corruption has significant implication for electoral 
justice in Nigeria; not just for litigation but for electoral dispute resolution generally. If the 
courts can become a target of political investors and corruption can permeate the hallowed 
chambers of justice and turn justice into an ‘auctionable’ item, then it is doubtful that the 
mere adoption of another EDR mechanism — without adequately addressing the issue of 
corruption — is the panacea to the inefficiency of the Nigerian EDR system. This doubt 
becomes more palpable in view of records of the corruption and partisanship of other key 
institutions like the INEC and police, which are also involved in electoral justice.
151
  
Although Chukwuemerie argues that a private practitioner of a lucrative trade like arbitration 
is more likely to absolutely shun corruption than a salary earner,
152
 it does not appear 
probable that any dispute resolution mechanism can effectively operate in a corrupt 
environment. Susceptibility to corruption is determined by various factors — personal, 
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cultural, institutional and organisational—and not solely the sector of employment.
153
 As 
such, any institution in a corrupt environment can be affected. As well noted, it is only a few 
judges in Nigeria that are corrupt,
154
 yet the whole judicial system is negatively impacted. 
Similarly, if a few private ADR practitioners are corrupt, the whole system will be affected. 
Even if such practitioners are disengaged by their employers and disaccredited by regulatory 
bodies, the loss of confidence due to their corruption will still affect the whole system, the 
same way the dismissal of some judges on ground of corruption has not fully restored public 
confidence in the judiciary. In other words, corruption has the potential to negatively impact 
the application of ADR in EDR in Nigeria if not properly addressed. 
The corruption and inefficiency of other critical institutions in the administration of 
electoral justice have also been identified as factors that negatively affect the efficiency of 
litigation in EDR in Nigeria.
155
 As the effective administration of electoral justice by the 
judiciary requires the cooperation and efficiency of such institutions, the efficiency of the 
judiciary is, to a large extent, impacted by the inefficiency and corruption of the 
institutions.
156
 This position is, however, not limited to the judiciary. The effective 
administration of justice, generally, depends on the cooperation and efficiency of various 
institutions. In an electoral setting where suspicion is typical, such cooperation and efficiency 
are necessary to create an enabling environment for accountability and trust. They are 
therefore essential for the effective application of ADR in EDR in Nigeria, especially as ADR 
lacks coercive powers to compel compliance with outcomes.  
3.4 The demerits of litigation in EDR 
Apart from corruption and inefficiency of key institutions which are not peculiar to 
litigation, there are other drawbacks in EDR in Nigeria that are fallouts of the features of 
litigation.  One such drawback is the expensiveness and inconvenience of litigation. Coupled 
with the non-negotiable fees charged for filing court processes and securing the services of 
witnesses, the professional fees for retaining lawyers and other experts—often necessitated 
by the technicalities of litigation — makes litigation expensive. On the retention of lawyers, 
for instance, Jinadu notes that election cases are ‘a multimillion naira big business for the 
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 In addition to such fees, the cost implication of other processes, time and 
venue determined by the court outside the convenience of the disputants makes litigation 
highly expensive, inconvenient and dissatisfactory.  
Lack of confidentiality is another demerit of litigation.
158
 Since legal proceedings are 
and decisions are public, disputants lack the opportunity of preserving their privacy in respect 
of information disclosed in litigation. The inconvenience of such lack of privacy can deter 
disputants from disclosing relevant private information that can aid the effective resolution of 
disputes.  Besides, where disputants choose or are compelled to disclose such information, 
the consequences of the disclosure may be damaging and dissatisfactory. This is especially so 
as the electoral setting is characteristically competitive and attracts great public interest and 
attention.  
Escalation of disputes and damage to relationships have also been identified as 
demerits of litigation. According to Chukwuemerie, though the court can determine the rights 
and liabilities of disputants and may be able to compel cessation of outward expressions of 
grievance, it is ineffective in actually resolving disputes because it does not concern itself 
with the restoration of peace between the parties.
159
 Such ineffectiveness, it is argued, 
sometimes results in the escalation of disputes and damage to relationships.
160
 
The escalation of disputes and damage to relationships are also attributed to other 




 The implication 
of this is that competition and the multiplicity of participants can have adverse effects on 
dispute resolution. Although these features are not common in ADR, failure to address the 
factors that stimulate unwholesome competition for political offices and the involvement of 
representatives and supporters, which is sometimes permitted during ADR proceedings, may 
adversely impact the efficiency of ADR in EDR. 
Delay in justice delivery is another serious demerit of litigation. Due to the volume of 
cases filed in courts and the technicalities of litigation, the courts are regularly congested and 
take a long period to determine individual cases.
163
 In addition, the provision for appeal 
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elongates the determination period of disputes to a frustrating point, with electoral disputes 
taking about three years to be finalised.
164
  
As elections are time bound, delay in the determination of cases has serious adverse 
implications for electoral justice delivery. For example, in the 2007 presidential election, the 
delay in the determination of a pre-election dispute over the eligibility of the Action Congress 
party presidential candidate frustrated electoral plans, resulted in the printing of 65 million 
fresh presidential election ballot papers within three days, and caused serious logistical 
problems that nearly marred the 2007 elections.
165
 Delay in dispute determination also leads 
to outright injustice where rightfully elected candidates are deprived of the opportunity of 
exercising their mandate for over two years of a four-year term.
166
 Apart from injustice 
against the elected candidates, such deprivation amounts to injustice against the electorate 
and the state, as the choices of the electorate are unduly kept in abeyance while unlawfully 
returned candidates are granted access to state resources. 
In recent years, however, considerable improvement in the disposition of election 
petitions in Nigeria has been recorded, with over 93 per cent of election petitions being 
disposed of within a year.
167
 This is attributed to some reforms of the EDR legal framework, 
one of which is the introduction of specific timeframes for the filing and determination of 
election petitions.  Aside from signalling that the challenge of delay can be surmounted with 
proper reforms, the improvement indicates that delay is, to a large extent, not peculiar to 
litigation. In other words, it shows that, although the technicalities of litigation make delay 
more probable in litigation, other mechanisms of dispute resolution are also amenable to 
delay where external factors which give rise to delay are not adequately addressed. This 
position finds support in a report on the 2015 general elections, which stated that: 
The judiciary made serious efforts to provide timely administration of justice for the high 
volume of pre-election suits. Nevertheless, the lack of time limits … in combination with 
loopholes allowing lawyers to delay cases unnecessarily, left the majority of cases pending 
before the courts for after the elections, thus compromising the right to a timely remedy.
168
 
The implication of the report for the application of ADR in EDR in Nigeria is that non-
prescription of timeframes and delaying strategies are factors that can adversely impact the 
efficiency of a dispute resolution mechanism. Bearing in mind the desperate manner in which 
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some politicians pursue political offices and electoral disputes, it is not unlikely that delay 
strategies can also be employed to frustrate ADR, if relevant structures are not either put in 
place or demolished to foil such strategies.  
3.5 Conclusion 
With the exception of a limited class of electoral disputes that are required by the 
Constitution, statutes or public policy considerations to be determined by litigation, ADR is 
legally applicable in EDR in Nigeria. However, the employment of ADR in EDR in Nigeria 
is deterred by some factors, including the adversarial disposition of some politicians in the 
pursuit of political office. Coupled with the inefficiency and corruption of some officers and 
institutions involved in the administration of electoral justice, such disposition and the 
negative strategies they engender can significantly affect the application of ADR, if not 
properly addressed. Accordingly, for ADR to be effective in EDR in Nigeria, such factors 















ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN PERSPECTIVE 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter appraises the viability of applying Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
in Electoral Dispute Resolution (EDR) within the Nigerian socio-political setting. The first 
part of the chapter provides an overview of what is meant by ADR in the context of this 
research. The second part looks at the evolution and application of African Dispute 
Resolution and ADR mechanisms in the resolution of disputes in Nigeria, with a view to 
assessing its suitability and practicability in the country. Part three considers trends in the 
adoption of ADR in EDR while parts four and five respectively reflect on the merits and 
demerits of ADR in the resolution of electoral disputes. In its entirety the chapter indicates 
the feasibility of the adoption of ADR as an effective dispute resolution mechanism within 
the Nigerian electoral sector but sets out some factors that can affect the efficiency of the 
mechanism. 
4.2 Alternative Dispute Resolution: An overview 





. Notwithstanding, the term generally refers to an assortment of 
processes that utilise amicable means in resolving disputes outside of litigation or court-based 
adjudication. This does not imply that ADR comprises all non-litigation dispute resolution 
methods. There are other non-litigation dispute resolution processes that are not part of the 
ADR family.
171
 ADR essentially encompasses processes that utilise non-adversarial means of 
resolution and focus on the interests of the parties rather than the strict determination of legal 
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 Its processes are basically regulated by the consensual decisions of the parties 
instead of predetermined legal technicalities.
173
 
The ADR family is made up of processes such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, 
facilitation, fact-finding, neutral evaluation, expert determination, ombudsman, arbitration,
174
 
private judging, and regulatory agencies’ formal administrative dispute resolution 
procedures.
175
 It also embraces hybrid processes such as Med-Arb and Arb-Med.
176
 The list 
of its processes is actually not circumscribed to these processes alone, as new processes are 
often developed to suit diverse kinds of disputes.
177
 However, ADR fundamentally 






Aside from diversity in its processes, ADR assumes diversity and flexibility in its form 
and process of initiation. In form, ADR may be advisory, consensual, or adjudicatory.
179
 It 
may be evaluative, facilitative, transformative, or determinative.
180
 It may also be binding or 
non-binding, and court-annexed or private.
181
 In terms of initiation, ADR may be court-
ordered, legislatively or administratively mandated, or party contracted.
182
 It may also be 
court-referred, walk-in or direct intervention initiated.
183
 The form or mode of initiation of a 
process in any particular circumstance largely depends on the nature of the dispute, the 
relationship between the parties, the intention of the parties and the administering institution. 
In any circumstance, however, the ultimate determinant is the appropriateness of the adopted 
approach for the resolution of the dispute. In other words, ADR is generally informal and 
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flexible, yet aimed at satisfying the interests of the parties in a manner that satisfies basic 
standards of justice delivery. 
ADR also exudes diversity in terms of its outcome. The adoption of ADR mechanisms is 
not limited to the resolution of disputes. It is, sometimes, aimed at the prevention and 
management of disputes. As a preventive mechanism, it is employed to negotiate the terms of 
relationships, for the avoidance of misunderstanding and ensuing conflicts. When adopted as 
a management mechanism, it is aimed at avoiding the escalation of conflict pending 
resolution. In any of these circumstances, the appropriateness of the mechanism is a key 
determinant of its adoption.  
The adoption of ADR does not necessarily imply the loss of faith in the judicial system.
184
 
It basically reveals that litigation is not a ‘fit-all’ or impeccable dispute resolution system but 
only one of a variety of available dispute resolution systems. This is because ADR was not 
developed to replace litigation but to remedy the shortcomings of litigation which include 
delay, rigidity, expensiveness and inappropriateness in some situations.
185
 Put differently, 
ADR is aimed at providing supplementary means of dispute resolution that will provide 
speedy resolution of disputes to aid decongestion in courts, be cost effective, and offer 
appropriate processes for resolution of disputes that are not litigation-suited.
186
 Accordingly, 
rather than undermine the worth and efficacy of litigation, the adoption of ADR enhances the 
efficiency of litigation and improves access to justice through a reasonable degree of 
informality.
187
 Nonetheless, ADR is not a ‘fit-all’ system: though it can be described as a ‘fit-
many’ system, like other dispute resolution systems, it has its limitations, especially in the 
present Nigerian socio-political setting.    
4.3 The evolution and practice of ADR in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, as in other African states, the evolution of what could be termed an ‘African’ 
Dispute Resolution system — akin to what is now termed ADR — dates back to time 
immemorial.
188
 Before the advent of the British, customary mediation, negotiation, 
arbitration, and litigation (not as complex and technical as the British-oriented litigation) 
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were utilised in Nigeria for the resolution of diverse disputes.
189
 These processes were 
embedded in custom and dictated by the socio-political experiences and values of the 
people.
190
 They were aimed at promoting societal peace and focused on reconciliation, 
restitution and societal cohesion.
191
 Accordingly, the interests considered were not only of the 




African dispute resolution processes were effectively utilised in the resolution of all 
kinds of disputes in Nigeria before the advent of British colonialism. Following British 
colonisation and subjugation of traditional systems, British-oriented litigation became the 
predominant dispute resolution method and African processes were relegated to the 
background.
193
 However, they were not effectively extinguished; they are still in practice in 
some communities (though generally at a minimal level) and some aspects are recognised 
under the formal legal system.
194
 
With exposure of the inadequacies of British-oriented litigation and resultant 
disenchantment of the populace with the system in recent times, the adoption of a 
supplementary or alternative dispute resolution mechanism to litigation became necessary in 
Nigeria. This led to the adoption of ADR, which, though slightly different especially in terms 
of administering institutions and procedure, is substantially the same as the African dispute 




The ‘welcome back pack’ officially made its debut in Nigeria in 2002,
196
 with the 
establishment of the Lagos Multi-Door Courthouse.
197
 Since then, the system has been 
gaining acceptance with the courts and the public. Multi-Door Courthouses have been 
established in other parts of the country,
198
 and most courts have amended their Rules to 
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incorporate provisions that enhance the practice of ADR.
199
 The National Industrial Court of 
Nigeria Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Centre has also been established,
200
 and the 
practice of ADR is promoted in criminal justice administration through statutory provisions 
for compounding of cases, the encouragement of amicable settlement and plea bargaining.
201
 
Besides, some Ministries of Justice have established Citizenship and Mediation Centres that 
conduct and promote ADR practice.
202
 There are also numerous private ADR centres in 
Nigeria.
203
 Interestingly, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) also has an 
ADR unit. Thus, ADR is currently officially recognised and promoted in Nigeria.  
Since its resurgence in Nigeria, ADR has been embraced and utilised by the courts, 
other ADR administering institutions, and the public in the resolution of varied types of 
cases, especially commercial disputes. Significant achievements have been recorded and 
satisfaction has been expressed with the utilisation of the mechanism. As Uwazie neatly 
captures: 
Since the creation of the pioneering Lagos Multidoor Courthouse and its ADR Center in 
2002, disputing parties now have the option of choosing among court-connected alternative 
methods to resolve their disputes… with an average of approximately 200 cases mediated 
monthly and resolution or settlement rates ranging from 60 to 85 percent…. 
In November 2009…Lagos State held its first mediation week…. Using lessons learned from 
earlier experiences, nearly 60 percent of the mediations resulted in agreement. Over 98 
percent of disputants surveyed expressed satisfaction with the process, and nearly 70 percent 
said they preferred mediation to court litigation. Most of the participating lawyers also found 
the process satisfactory and indicated that they would recommend it to their clients.
204
 
The success rate and positive response suggest that the system is in tune with African—
particularly Nigerian—philosophy, custom and traditional concepts of justice.
205
 In fact, they 
suggest that the system is not only suitable but also viable in Nigeria.
206
 However, the success 
of ADR in the resolution of other types of disputes in Nigeria is yet to be recreated in respect 
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of the resolution of electoral disputes. This situation, as indicated in the previous chapter, is a 
consequence of several factors, one of which is the impact of colonialism on ADR practice in 
Nigeria. Colonisation and the consequent introduction of British-oriented legal system set a 
limit to the type of disputes that can be resolved through ADR. While there was no limit on 
the type of disputes that could be resolved under the African dispute resolution system, the 
type of disputes that can be resolved under the Western-influenced ADR system is 
determined by statutes and public policy.
207
 Another contributory factor, also indicated in the 
previous chapter, is the lack of an enabling federal legal and institutional framework for the 
application of ADR to electoral disputes that are not excluded from resolution by ADR. The 
major ADR enabling legal frameworks and administering institutions in Nigeria operate at 
the state level. The application of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which is an ADR-
enabling federal instrument, is limited to arbitration and conciliation in commercial disputes. 
Similarly, the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria ADR Centre, which is 
the only federal court-annexed ADR centre, is limited to the matters prescribed in section 
254C of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and section 7 
of the National Industrial Court Act of 2006 which do not include electoral matters.
208
 
Regrettably, the INEC ADR unit that would have been a vanguard for the promotion and 
application of ADR in the resolution of electoral disputes is yet to make inroads. On the 
provision of ADR services by INEC and the general mood respecting the employment of 
ADR in the 2015 general elections in Nigeria, Afolabi and Avasiloae report: 
Across the states under review, few mechanisms for consensus-building, dialogue and 
dispute-resolution are well-entrenched. Tensions emerged at various points during the 2015 
electoral cycle, and escalated as the polls approached, but ADR was not applied effectively in 
response. In the states that were assessed, few if any bodies possessed the mandate, desire and 
capacity to intervene directly between the competing parties. INEC created in-house ADR 
units to resolve pre-election disputes, but hardly any interviewees described specific cases in 
which INEC officials provided this type of assistance…. INEC itself acknowledged that most 
disputes still went to the Lagos courts for adjudication and were not handled by its ADR 
unit.
209
    
The reported situation in Nigeria does not imply that ADR cannot be an effective 
mechanism in the resolution of electoral disputes. According to the Nigerian Electoral 
Reform Committee, out of court settlement of electoral disputes has been a feature of 
                                                          
207
 Chukwuemerie op cit note 15 at 123. 
208
 Article 4 (1), (4) and (5) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
Instrument, 2015. 
209






 Though there is a credible suggestion that they are usually through 
‘Party’s instructions’,
211
 such settlements indicate that electoral disputes can be resolved 
through ADR in Nigeria. The positive results from the employment of ADR in the 2015 
general elections, albeit as a preventive mechanism, also lend credence to this position.
212
  
ADR has also proved effective in the resolution of electoral disputes in other states. 
Within Africa, good results have been achieved in various countries including South Africa 
and Kenya.
213
 According to Chukwuemerie: 
It has become a reoccurring event in Africa however that even when a political dispute has 
become so deep-set that it is insoluble through the Courts or any other medium, it can be 
sorted out through the ADRs. Examples abound but two recent and prominent ones should 
suffice. The nearly intractable post-election dispute in Kenya between President Mwai Kibaki 
and Mr. Raila Odinga was eventually resolved through mediation by another African, Mr. 
Kofi Anan the immediate past UN Secretary-General. This was after so much life and 
property as well as national reputation had been lost. Following the Zimbabwean national 
elections of 2008-9, the equally destructive and intractable dispute between President Robert 
Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangiria was eventually settled through the mediatory efforts of the 
then President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa.
214
 
The successful application of ADR in the resolution of electoral disputes in these States 
suggests that ADR is appropriate and can be effective in the resolution of electoral disputes in 
Nigeria. As Uwazie explains:  
Conflicts in Africa have much in common, and striking parallels can be drawn between them 
at all levels…. lessons learned through community mediation, for example in South Africa, 
are applicable to the most complex and largest conflicts to be found on the continent…. As 
African conflict dynamics and mediation processes can be seen as analogous, on levels 
ranging from the community to the international arena, so too are many of the issues and 
interests affecting countries, political parties, ethnic groups, interest groups, and communities 
and civil societies….  A major premise of ADR or peace education is that lessons learned 
from conflict resolution in larger regional or national conflicts are applicable to community 
mediation, and vice-versa. Approaches that were successful in the Democratic Republic of 
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4.4 Trends in the adoption of ADR in EDR 
As controversies and cynicism attend the resolution of electoral disputes in many counties, 
the international community has, in recent years, been focusing on the diverse means by 
which fair, effective and timely resolution of electoral disputes can be achieved.
216
 Although 
there are no international instruments that specifically stipulate particular mechanisms for 
states to adopt in the resolution of electoral disputes, international documents on political and 
electoral rights establish that states have a responsibility to ensure that electoral disputes are 
promptly and effectively determined within the timeframe of the electoral process by an 
independent and impartial authority.
217
 The International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
(IFES) has also identified standards for electoral dispute resolution. These standards are the 
availability of a transparent right of redress for election irregularities, a clearly defined 
regimen of election standards and procedures, an impartial and informed arbiter, a system 
that judicially expedites decisions, established burdens of proof and standards of evidence, 
meaningful and effective remedies, and effective education of stakeholders. While some 
appear, on superficial reading, to exclude non-judicial resolution of electoral disputes, these 




Confirming this status of ADR in the electoral sector, electoral dispute resolution 
experts, at a meeting hosted by the Carter Centre in 2009, agreed that legal proceedings are 
only one of the various means by which electoral disputes can be resolved effectively.
219
 
They also agreed that disputes that do not involve fundamental rights or non-discriminatory 
state actions can be resolved outside litigation.
220
 The establishment of Congolese National 
Mediation Commission of the Electoral Process (CNMPE) in November 2011, under the 
auspices of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), also lend support to the international recognition of this 
status of ADR in EDR.
 221
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Various continental and regional unions also recognise and support the adoption of 
ADR as an appropriate and effective method of resolving electoral disputes.  In Africa, the 
African Union, in line with its main objective of promoting peace, security and stability on 
the continent, has put in place various organs and structures with the mandate to prevent, 
manage and resolve electoral disputes.
222
 Its approaches to electoral disputes, through its 
Missions, include early warning and preventive diplomacy, election observation and 
monitoring, postelection mediation, technical and governance assistance, and post-conflict 
reconstruction and development (PCRD).
223
  
The African Union has successfully mediated electoral disputes in some African 
states including Kenya and Zimbabwe, though the approach it mostly adopts is election 
observation.
224
 It has also contributed to the prevention of electoral conflicts in some states 
through pre-election preventive diplomacy and mediation.
225
 Similarly, regional groups such 
as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common Market of Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have attempted 
mediation of electoral disputes in various African States at some points.
226
 Thus, ADR can be 
regarded as a suitable and acceptable EDR mechanism in Africa.  
At the national level, governments adopt various mechanisms, depending on the 
political traditions and the legal and electoral frameworks of the country. The trend, however, 
is towards a diversified and flexible dispute resolution system. Following this trend, some 
African states, including South Africa and Kenya, have formally adopted ADR as part of 
their EDR system.  
Under the South African EDR system, ADR mechanisms such as consultation, 
negotiation, mediation and administrative procedures are employed in the resolution of 
electoral disputes, particularly under the Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996 and the 
Electoral Commission Regulations on Party Liaison Committees, GN R824 in GG 18978 19 
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June 1998. Under section 6 of these Regulations, the Party Liaison Committees serve as 
vehicles for consultation and co-operation between the Electoral Commission (EC) and 
registered parties on all electoral matters.
227
 By the provisions of section 5(1) of the Electoral 
Commission Act, the EC is empowered to ‘establish and maintain liaison and co-operation 
with parties’. The EC also has the mandate to ‘promote co-operation with and between 
persons, institutions, governments and administrations for the achievement of its objects,’ and 
is vested with the jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes of an administrative nature which may 
arise from the organisation, administration or conduct of elections.
228
 Though the decisions of 
the EC relating to an electoral matter are appealable and subject to review by the Electoral 
Court,
229
 the empowerment of the EC to deal with disputes as they arise and the use of ADR 
prevent delay and promote efficiency in the system.
230
 
In Kenya, the adoption of ADR in the resolution of electoral disputes is formally 
endorsed by the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission Act 9 of 2011, the Elections Act of 2011 (as Revised), and the Political Parties 
Act 11 of 2011. Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution specifically provides, without exclusion 
of electoral disputes, that in exercising judicial authority the courts and tribunals shall 
promote alternative forms of dispute resolution including reconciliation, mediation, 
arbitration and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. The Constitution, with various laws 
enacted under it, also created other institutions with specific mandates to resolve electoral 
disputes.
231
 For instance, by the provisions of Article 88(4)(e) of the Constitution, the 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) is vested with the jurisdiction to 
settle electoral disputes.
232
 Similarly, under section 40(1) of the Political Parties Act 11 of 
2011, the Political Parties Disputes Tribunal (PPDT) is vested with powers to determine 
certain electoral disputes.
233
 The resolution of electoral disputes within political parties by 
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ADR mechanisms is also permitted by section 40(2) of the Political Parties Act.
234
 Other 
institutions empowered to determine electoral disputes include the Electoral Code of Conduct 
Enforcement Committee and the Constituency Peace Committees.
235
  
The employment of these mechanisms in Kenya helps to decongest the courts, avoids 
delay, and ensures that disputes are determined by election commissioners who have practical 
understanding and experience of election law and regulation implementation.
236
 During the 
2013 elections, for example, the Dispute Resolution Committee constituted by the IEBC 
determined close to 2000 complaints within the constitutional timelines.
237
 When the number 
of cases handled by other institutions involved in electoral dispute resolution in the country is 
added to this volume, the relief afforded the courts by these mechanisms can be well 




Despite the successes achieved through the current Kenyan EDR system, the 
arrangement of the system, as the IEBC notes, ‘led to concurrent jurisdiction, characterized 
by forum shopping, overlapping jurisdiction and in certain instances duplications’.
239
 
Besides, statutory provisions and institution building alone could not ‘alter the climate of zero 
sum competition and illegal election strategies in the absence of changed incentive structures 
among Kenyan political elites’.
 240
 These fallouts of the Kenyan electoral system undermined 
the efficacy of the EDR system, resulting in its failure to effectively manage and resolve 
electoral disputes during the 2017 elections. 
4.5 The merits of the adoption of ADR in EDR 
From the successes of ADR in EDR some merits are deducible.  One merit is decongestion 
and therefore potentially greater efficiency of the courts. As the disputes that would otherwise 
have been determined by litigation are resolved through ADR (especially when administered 
by other institutions), the courts are relieved of the burden of handling excessive case-loads. 
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This affords the courts more time and speed in the determination of cases that are litigation-
suited. This advantage is important in the electoral sector because of the time-constrained 
nature of electoral activities and the dire consequences of delay in the resolution of electoral 
disputes. It is also of immense benefit considering the general problem of sluggishness in the 
majority of African courts, where it is no longer news that cases drag on for years. Affording 
opportunity for improvement or preventing aggravation of such inefficiency is meritorious.  
 ADR also saves costs by enabling timely resolution of disputes that are not litigation-
suited. Being largely informal, ADR is flexible and not encumbered by the technicalities that 
delay litigation processes. It affords disputants a reasonable level of control, familiarity and 
satisfaction with the resolution process. This, coupled with the amicable ambiance that the 
informality creates, provides incentives for timely settlement of electoral disputes by 
deterring disputants from taking steps or holding tenaciously to legal claims that aggravate 
the dispute and clog settlement. The promise of favourable outcomes that ADR offers by 
emphasising the exploration of opportunities for mutual benefits also stimulates a positive 
disposition to settlement. The speedy resolution of disputes saves disputants the time, 
resources and energy that would otherwise be expended on lengthy legal battles. 
 The confidentiality that ADR provides is also advantageous in EDR. Confidentiality 
encourages honesty by dispelling inhibition in giving evidence of personal and sensitive 
issues in the proceedings. It also precludes competitiveness since the proceedings are not 
open to observers, whose presence can provoke competitiveness and insistence on previously 
announced positions.
241
 By boosting honesty and preventing negative external influences, 
confidentiality promotes timely resolution of electoral disputes.   
The timely resolution of electoral disputes promotes peace and order in society. Due 
to the socio-economic values attached to elections, ethno-religious hostilities are easily 
triggered and escalated during elections. Delay in the resolution of the disputes poses a threat 
to the peace, unity and survival of society as lives and property are lost in ensuing violence. 
Contrariwise, timely resolution of the disputes prevents the escalation of conflicts, thereby 
promoting peace and order in society. The experiences of Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo as well as other African states exemplify this point.  
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 Another merit of ADR in EDR is the opportunity it provides for good governance. 
According to Chukwuemerie, litigation determines cases by the delivery of a judgement that 
is based on the parties’ legal rights and liabilities, without a consideration of the actual 
interests and desires of the parties.
242
 What this achieves, in his words, is ‘an imposed term 
for the cessation of combat’ and not a resolution of the dispute.
243
 Such cessation of combat, 
he maintains, ‘does not secure peace’ but ‘sometimes leads to a deepening of the dispute,’ 
which hampers good governance.
244
 With examples, he concludes: 
It has almost always turned out that when political disputes (such as who has been duly 
elected or returned in an election) are settled through the Courts, the parties may accept the 
verdict and the declared winner forms the government, but the parties would go on in residual 
disputes. It would be very difficult for them to come together and work together for the 
interest of the country. This has happened at one point in time or the other in Nigeria, Ghana, 
Liberia, Egypt, Madagascar and in countries outside Africa such as Chile and Sri Lanka. This 
would make room for unhealthy political rivalry most of the times.
245
 
To enable good governance therefore, proper resolution of electoral disputes is crucial, and 
ADR facilitates such resolution. The informality, confidentiality and amiability that ADR 
provides stimulate honesty and cooperation in disputants. These features enable discovery 
and proper reconciliation of the real interests of the parties. In the process hurts are healed, 
relationships are restored, and satisfactory resolution is achieved.
246
 Parties are therefore 
potentially better disposed to work together for the interest and good governance of the 
polity. 
 ADR also offers quality resolution of disputes. This is achieved sometimes by the 
freedom it affords parties to determine the expertise of the third party that will assist in the 
resolution of their dispute.
247
 It is achieved at other times by the opportunity it provides for 
resolution of the disputes by institutions and persons that have experience and expertise in 
elections and implementation of regulations.
248
 Determinations by such persons or 
institutions are likely to be just, balanced, professional and more acceptable than judgements 
handed down by non-experts that the parties do not appreciate. Moreover, since ADR 
preserves relationships and offers opportunity for expression of views and control of the 
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resolution process by the disputants, its outcomes are more satisfactory and enforceable than 
imposed decisions.    
 The improvement of civil discourse and political culture is another advantage of ADR 
in EDR.
249
 The emphasis of ADR on co-operation, mutual gains and reconciliation motivates 
a change of attitude and orientation from hostility to civility, unlike litigation which promotes 
competitiveness and hostility. The resolution of disputes through ADR also reduces the 
number of cases that are disposed to ‘caustic language in election law judicial decisions’ and 
diminishes opportunity for negative and inciting reports from the media and the public.
250
 By 
motivating civility and reducing provocation and escalation of pre-existing political 
animosity, the adoption of ADR in EDR stimulates amity and concord in the polity. 
Finally, the adoption of ADR in EDR provides access to electoral justice. As the 
processes are informal and flexible, they are more accessible and attractive to disputants.  
Besides, as ADR permits expression of views and control of the processes by the disputants, 
it affords ample opportunity for the achievement of justice in EDR. In other words, ADR 
leads to efficient and better justice delivery in the electoral sector and polity as a whole.
251
 
4.6 The demerits of the adoption of ADR in EDR 
The stated merits notwithstanding, the adoption of ADR in EDR is not without demerits. One 
of the demerits is the lack of coercive powers for the enforcement of outcomes. The 
enforcement of ADR outcomes generally depends on the voluntary compliance of the parties 
with the outcomes. Where a party fails to comply with such outcomes, the settlement effort 
may be frustrated or, at best, the affected party may only have recourse to the courts for 
enforcement.
252
 As such, ADR seems an inefficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes 
where the stakes are high or in an environment where there is distrust, acrimony and power 
imbalance.
253
 Since these are common traits in electoral settings, the effectiveness of ADR in 
the electoral sector is not guaranteed. Its adoption may also lead to delay and escalation of 
conflicts as disputes may need to be litigated afresh where there is non-compliance with 
outcomes. Considering that time is of the essence in elections and related activities, this raises 
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doubt about the practicality of ADR in EDR. This doubt is especially palpable in a context 
where the electoral stakes are high and the electoral system is marked by disregard for basic 
societal norms, lack of dedication to the rule of law, and abuse of the power of incumbency. 
However, this demerit can be cured by making provisions for the bindingness and 
enforceability of ADR outcomes involving electoral disputes, as has been done for other 
types of disputes in the Multi-Door Courthouses in Nigeria and some other jurisdictions.
254
  
Another weakness of ADR in EDR is the possibility of frustration of resolution efforts 
due to some disputants’ non-cooperation. Since ADR is usually consensual, its efficiency 
may be challenged by difficulties in securing the attendance and participation of disputants 
because of characteristic distrust and hostility in electoral settings. The refusal of a 
recalcitrant party to engage in a resolution process may foil the process, especially as ADR 
practitioners lack coercive powers to secure the attendance of parties. Nonetheless, statutory 
prescriptions of how such proceedings can be conducted in the absence of a disinterested 
disputant can remedy this weakness.
255
 
Douglas opines that the adoption of ADR in EDR may also undermine the importance 
of vindicating legal rights in the electoral sector.
256
 Since the outcomes of ADR processes are 
usually based on the negotiating power and consent of the parties, and not on established 
legal rights, the parties may not be able to insist on their legal rights in the settlement process. 
They may have to settle for less than their entitlements, especially due to the power 
imbalance that usually exists between parties in the electoral sector. The adoption of ADR in 
EDR therefore appears to have the potential of leading to injustice, breeding disregard for 
legal rights, and reinforcing pre-existing imbalances between parties in the electoral sector 
and the society at large.
257
 This defect can, however, be alleviated by subjecting certain 
aspects of the processes or outcomes of particular types of disputes in the sector to reasonable 
supervision by the courts or other regulatory agencies. 
 Injustice and disregard for the rule of law may also be occasioned where parties enter 
into agreements that are inconsistent with statutory provisions or judicial decisions on the 
issues in dispute.
258
 Such disregard may likely go unnoticed and unredressed since ADR 
proceedings are generally confidential. This demerit is of significant concern in the electoral 
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sector where the interests of the public are implicated and such agreements may affect the 
rights and interests of other citizens who may not be parties to the resolution process. 
Nevertheless, this flaw can also be diminished by provisions for reasonable supervision of the 
processes and outcomes by the courts. 
 The application of ADR in EDR may hinder the development of the law, promote 
uncertainty of governing rules, and occasion unfairness in the electoral sector.
259
  As ADR 
proceedings and outcomes are usually confidential and consensual, they do not provide 
precedents for reference in subsequent cases or records for review of applicable law on any 
particular issue. This has the potential of limiting review of the law and leading to diverse 
decisions in respect of similar issues in the sector. Bearing in mind that fairness and certainty 
of governing rules are necessary to maintain the credibility of the electoral system, this 
demerit of ADR renders its suitability in EDR doubtful. Making accommodations for 
provision of records regarding certain aspects of the processes or specific types of disputes in 
the sector may, however, cushion the effect of this demerit. Specifically, basic information 
about the nature of the dispute and reasons for decisions may be excluded from 
confidentiality. Apart from providing records for legal review and certainty of governing 
laws, this will permit functional monitoring of the processes by the public and ‘avoid the 
spread of false rumours and conspiracy theories’.
260
   
Finally, the adoption of ADR in EDR may negatively affect public standards as the 
confidentiality of the processes may shield objectionable acts of politicians from public 
scrutiny and redress, thereby perpetuating such acts. For instance, where a politician commits 
a serious crime in the course of elections that directly affects the interests of the public or 
may likely set a precedent for commission of the crime, the resolution of such dispute by 
ADR may undermine public standards. As the public may be uninformed of the decisions on 
the issues due to the confidentiality of the proceedings, an impression of the acceptance of the 
conduct may be created and others may be encouraged to emulate such conduct. The 
adoption of ADR in such circumstances may, therefore, be detrimental. Similarly, where 
there is a need for interpretation or clarification of some provisions or principles of law in the 
sector, the adoption of ADR may be disadvantageous. To avoid this defect, it is necessary 
that certain issues in the electoral sector — the private resolution of which may negatively 
impact public values or legal standards — be excluded from resolution by ADR. 
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4.7 Conclusion  
This chapter indicates that ADR improves the efficiency of the judiciary and access to justice. 
The efficiency of the mechanism in the resolution of other types of disputes in Nigeria as well 
as its merits and successes in the resolution of electoral disputes in other climes elucidates its 
essentiality, appropriateness, and feasibility in the resolution of electoral disputes in Nigeria. 
However, for the mechanism to be efficient and sustainable in the sector, potential problems 
with enforceability of outcomes, conduct of proceedings where a disputant is recalcitrant, 
development of the law, vindication of rights, and maintenance of public standards must 
deliberately be addressed. As these require the subjection of some aspects of ADR processes 
to reasonable supervision and support by the courts as well as the exclusion of some disputes 
from resolution through ADR, the efficiency of the judiciary is vital to the success of ADR in 






REFORMING THE NIGERIAN ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM  
5.1 Introduction 
Encompassing the findings and conclusions of this research, this chapter is a signpost on the 
position of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as an effective mechanism in Electoral 
Dispute Resolution (EDR) in Nigeria. The first section recaps the findings and unveils the 
challenges of ADR as an EDR mechanism in the present Nigerian socio-political setting. The 
second section, basically based on lessons drawn from the past reform experiences of Nigeria 
as well as the experiences of other states regarding EDR, provides a road map for achieving 
efficiency in the utilisation of ADR in EDR in Nigeria. As a whole, the chapter advances that, 
despite the present challenges, ADR can be a functional mechanism in EDR in Nigeria, given 
an enabling environment.  
5.2 The status of ADR in EDR in the present Nigerian socio-political setting 
ADR is a collection of dispute resolution processes that improve the efficiency of the judicial 
system and access to justice. It relieves the courts of the burden of handling excessive case-
loads, thereby enabling speedy and quality determination of cases by the courts. Its 
informality, flexibility and confidentiality enable control of the processes by the parties, 
provide convenience for the parties, and promote honesty and amicability in the proceedings. 
These, apart from boosting a positive disposition to resolution of disputes, enable discovery, 
reconciliation and satisfaction of the disputants’ real interests. Coupled with the civility that 
ADR promotes in public discourse, the satisfaction of parties’ interests and timely resolution 
of disputes stimulate concord, reduce provocation, and prevent escalation of pre-existing 
political animosity between parties. These promote peace, order and good governance in 
society.  
The merits of ADR in EDR make it attractive and essential as a mechanism to remedy 
the inadequacy of the Nigerian EDR system, particularly as regards delay and improper 
resolution of disputes. Notwithstanding, ADR is currently not formally endorsed or popularly 
utilised for EDR in Nigeria. This is not because ADR is unsuitable for EDR in Nigeria. 
Rather, it is due to some peculiar features of the present Nigerian socio-political setting. 
ADR is in tune with African values and traditions which aim at promoting peace and 




country’s cultural and historical character more than the court system’.
261
 From time 
immemorial, its processes, though not in the modern Western packaging, were effectively 
utilised in the resolution of all kinds of disputes in the diverse areas that constitute Nigeria. 
However, the colonisation and subsequent introduction of a new political system — with the 
British elective principle and formal dispute resolution system — by the British destabilised 
the pre-existing traditional political and dispute resolution systems. While the colonialists 
succeeded in merging the diverse pre-existing units into a single political entity, they failed to 
redirect allegiance from the various groups to the newly created entity but rather encouraged 
hostilities between the different groups through their ‘divide and rule’ style of governance. 
Consequently, group sentiments were transferred to and have been a part of elections in 
Nigeria from the colonial era till today. 
Notwithstanding the initiation by the British, the life wire of the continued existence 
and exploitation of group sentiments in elections in Nigeria is the socio-economic worth of 
political offices. The value of political office, accentuated by the winner-takes-all tendency of 
the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system practised in Nigeria, encourages some 
politicians to conceive political offices as avenues for the acquisition of wealth instead of an 
opportunity for public service. This conception breeds desperation and instigates exploitation 
of group affiliation and other objectionable strategies in their pursuit of political offices.  
The exploitation of group affiliations in elections results in the transfer of the interests 
of ethnic, religious and other groups to electoral processes. The transfer stirs and merges pre-
existing non-electoral disputes between groups with electoral processes, thereby escalating 
the electoral stakes and the group disputes. The escalation, in turn, prompts failure of 
adherence to basic principles of democracy and constitutionalism, lack of political will to 
enforce electoral laws and implement reforms, and the employment of objectionable 
strategies such as corruption of public officers and abuse of the power of incumbency to gain 
advantage in elections. It also prods a war-like disposition in some politicians to elections and 
EDR. Consequently, the Nigerian electoral setting is marked by violence, distrust, animosity 
and disregard for the rule of law and basic societal values.  
The current features of the Nigerian electoral setting, coupled with the perception of 
injustice and power imbalance which the value of political offices projects, render the 
Nigerian EDR setting currently unfavourable for an efficient and sustainable application of 
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ADR. This is because ADR is generally a voluntary and consensual process. The positive 
disposition of disputants to resolution through the mechanism is therefore requisite for its 
adoption and success. Where there is power imbalance and disregard for basic values, raising 
doubt regarding the fairness of the process and voluntary compliance by parties, requisite 
trust and positive disposition by disputants to amicable settlement will be lacking. This is 
more so as ADR ordinarily lacks coercive powers for enforcement of outcomes; engaging in 
a process that cannot be enforced when there is failure of compliance appears futile and 
unattractive. In addition, the war-like disposition of some politicians to elections inhibits 
voluntariness and cooperation that are requisite for effective utilisation of ADR. Therefore, 
EDR in Nigeria has been litigation-based, with all the associated demerits.  
The demerits of litigation render the current Nigerian EDR system inefficient, 
necessitating a reform through the adoption of ADR. However, for such reform to be 
effective, the Nigerian electoral setting must be favourable for the application of ADR. This 
requires several steps, within and outside the electoral and dispute resolution systems, to be 
taken. The steps are the concern of the next section. 
5.3 The indices for efficient application of ADR in EDR in Nigeria 
Achieving efficiency in the application of ADR in EDR in Nigeria is not a stand-alone 
process. It requires a comprehensive approach that entails legislative, structural, political, 
institutional and socio-economic reforms. In this regard, the provision of a statutory 
framework for the adoption of ADR in EDR and investment in capacity building through 
training and infrastructural support for ADR providers have been identified as necessary 
steps.
262
 The creation of appropriate incentives for lawyers and judges and the creation of 
synergy between formal/state ADR institutions and the informal/indigenous community 
sector have also been identified as requisite steps for the effective employment of ADR.
263
 
These are, however, not the only steps requisite for the adoption, efficiency and sustainability 
of ADR in EDR in Nigeria. There are other essential steps that must be taken.  
The foundational step to the efficiency and sustainability of ADR in EDR in Nigeria 
is to assess the effectiveness and shortcomings of the existing dispute resolution 
mechanism.
264
 This step will provide direction for, and focus on, the purpose and scope of the 
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 It will also facilitate a proper design of the ADR system necessary for its efficiency 
and sustainability. 
A proper design enables the flexibility of ADR to appropriately address a wide-range 
of issues whereas an improper design can render it entirely inappropriate and ineffective.
266
 
To be effective in EDR in Nigeria, therefore, the ADR system must be properly designed. 
Underscoring the importance of this point is the attribution of the failure of Nigeria’s 
democracy to an ‘inability to design an efficient, effective and politically non-partisan 
electoral process.’
267
 Another case in point is the failure of the Kenyan EDR system to 
effectively manage and resolve electoral disputes during the 2017 elections, though the 
utilisation of ADR is constitutionally endorsed. One of the identified defects of the system 
which occasioned the failure is its improper design which made the system complex and 
amenable to abuse, including forum-shopping.
268
 Accordingly, a proper design of the ADR 
system is essential to its efficiency and sustainability. 
A proper ADR design entails appropriateness and practicability of adopted remedies 
to identified shortcoming.  The goal(s) of ADR in EDR must therefore be specific, and its 
design must be driven by that goal.
269
 This requires an ADR system to be designed in a 
manner that is suitable and practicable for the type of issues to be addressed.
270
 It must be 
adaptable to the characteristics and context of the matter to be decided, and different 
institutions and processes must be used for different suited grievances.
271
 It must also be 
malleable enough to satisfy the interests of the parties in dispute and equally deliver justice 
‘in a dynamic yet culturally sensitive manner’.
272
  
One approach by which the appropriateness of ADR can be determined is to consider 
whether the disputes proposed to be resolved by ADR will impact public rights and whether 
the rights will have to be defined by those that the law seeks to regulate.
273
 Where this is the 
case, the application of ADR will be inappropriate, otherwise it may be appropriate. This 
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consideration helps to avoid destruction of the merits of the existing mechanism, particularly 
in preserving public rights and values.
274
  
A proper ADR design must also permit adequate synchronisation in the EDR system. 
An aspect of synchronisation is to avoid concurrence or overlap of jurisdictions. This is 
important because such allowance, as the Kenyan experience shows, can lead to abuse of 
process and forum shopping which can undermine the credibility and efficiency of the 
system. Another facet of synchronisation is creating a balance in the system by recognising 
the strengths of the existing mechanism and the limitations of ADR. This necessitates 
understanding that not all disputes can be, or should be, resolved by ADR. This is important 
because if ADR is not appropriate for a particular shortcoming of the EDR system, its 
application in the circumstance will be ineffective. To be effective and sustainable, therefore, 
an ADR system must be flexible enough to promote the reconciliation of interests, while also 
permitting the determination of rights or power for disputes that are not suited for resolution 
by focusing on interests.
275
  
Another important factor in ADR design is the need to meet domestic and 
international standards.
276
 This requires that the processes be designed to satisfy basic criteria 
of justice delivery. It necessitates that where rights will be implicated, judicial appeal should 
be guaranteed or the extent to which the implementation of such rights can be negotiated 
should be specified.
277
 It also demands addressing certain design questions, including the 
determination of the parties that can bring claims through the mechanism, the extent to which 
outcomes can affect unrepresented parties, and the appropriateness and degree of 
confidentiality in the system. Questions regarding precedent setting and the scope of 
interaction with the formal legal system, especially in terms of the appropriateness, extent 
and standard of review, also need to be considered. Other crucial issues to be addressed 
include the method of selection and role of mediators or neutrals, the remedies and 
mechanisms of outcome enforcement, and the burden of proof and standard of evidence.
278
 A 
proper consideration of these issues is necessary because they impact the perception of the 
electorate regarding the credibility and legitimacy of the system and the extent to which it 
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will be considered an attractive alternative to the existing mechanism.
279
 How these issues are 
approached, therefore, determine disposition to the adoption and efficiency of ADR.  
To meet domestic standards the issues must be addressed based on adequate analysis 
of the peculiar circumstances of the country. The ADR design should ‘be driven by national 
considerations’ and should ‘respond to the specific historical and cultural experiences of the 
country and the country’s changing social, demographic and economic environment’.
280
 It 
should be consistent with the country’s traditions and compatible with the values of the 
stakeholders.
281
 This demands that the design must not be arbitrarily imposed on the 
stakeholders but should involve and be a collective effort of all the stakeholders. It 
necessitates building consensus among various classes of stakeholders including the 
legislature, political parties, civil society, INEC and communities. It also involves 
resuscitating and liaising with traditional or community-based dispute resolution institutions, 
especially as they are more flexible and sensitive to their environment.
282
  
A proper design therefore requires the adoption of a bottom-up approach which takes 
account of the diversity and local contexts of all the stakeholders. The approach enables the 
stakeholders to identify with the system and precludes undue influence of the design by 
parochial interests. It is essential because any reform or regulation that is not driven from the 
bottom or with which the people do not identify is unsustainable.
283
 The inclusiveness of the 
process ensures public confidence in and acceptability of the system, thereby enhancing its 
efficiency.
284
 It is especially necessary considering arguments that a majority of the electoral 
laws in the country are non-functional because the politicians whose activities are supposed 
to be regulated by the laws are the ones designing the legal framework and, as such, the laws 
are largely influenced by their parochial interests.
285
 Records disclose that the approach 
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proved effective in mitigating the 2006 election conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and the 2007 post-election conflict in Lesotho.
286
 
For inclusiveness to be achieved, the patterns of interaction in the country must 
change.
287
 The political class must be willing to engage in genuine negotiations with other 
stakeholders on a level-playing platform. Politicians must also regard other stakeholders as 
partners and not as subordinates. Public forums and informal meetings that will promote 
cooperation and participatory democracy must be actively and regularly organised by 
relevant agencies. The government must also be accountable to the citizenry and committed 
to democratic governance and development.
288
 These steps are necessary to arouse positive 
dispositions to employment of ADR by impressing on the electorate the sincerity and 
willingness of the political class to pursue mutual benefits and justice in society.  
 Another aspect of an EDR system that impacts the effectiveness of ADR is the 
legislative approach.
289
 To ensure the efficiency and sustainability of ADR in EDR, the 
electoral legal framework must be attractive. The laws governing elections, especially those 
regulating ADR, must display a reasonable degree of fairness and possibility of impartial and 
balanced application. The laws must not be discriminatory or afford some actors advantages 
to the detriment of others. They should be inclusive and objective enough to give the 
stakeholders a reasonable sense of recognition and fairness in the system. They should also 
be practicable. This is because the perception of fairness and practicability promotes 
satisfaction with the system and compliance with outcomes, whereas unfairness and lack of 
implementation structures or other factors that give the laws mere cosmetic appearance 
undermine the efficacy of the laws and the electorate’s confidence in the system.
290
  
To boost fairness in the system, the legal framework must create a platform for 
disputants to participate genuinely, meaningfully and freely. Such participation promotes 
consensuality, which largely determines the legitimacy of ADR processes.
291
 Gaining such 
participation requires that adequate provisions should be made to address power imbalances, 
which is typical in the electoral sphere. Although it may be argued that the existence of 
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power imbalances does not necessarily lead to an exercise of power by the more advantaged 
party,
292
 power imbalances may negatively affect the disposition and participation of 
disputants in the process. It may incite perceptions that the process is an avenue for the 
imposition of the powerful party’s decision on the weaker or impugn the neutrality and 
impartiality of the neutrals. Addressing power imbalances therefore increases the justice 
orientation of the system and preserves the integrity of the process.
293
 It also diminishes the 
vulnerability of the process to outcomes that are unfairly advantageous to one party and of 




For ADR to be efficient in EDR, it is also important that parties perceive ADR 
administrators and neutrals to be accountable and trustworthy.
295
 This is necessary due to the 
sensitive nature of electoral disputes which may require the disclosure, in confidentiality 
during ADR proceedings, of issues that are important to the livelihood and reputation of the 
parties or have significant public implications. It is therefore crucial that the system be 
designed to ensure the responsibility and professionality of practitioners. The practitioners 
need to assume the obligation to ensure that parties feel comfortable with the administration 
and conduct of the processes.
296
They also need to appreciate the sensitivity of the processes 
and to ‘recognize their role as one of assistance, not control’.
297
 They must, in addition, 
endeavour to safeguard the inclusiveness of the processes. In view of the public interest in 
and implication of the outcome of EDR processes, ADR practitioners ought to accept the 
responsibility for ensuring that the interests of parties not directly involved in negotiations, 
but with a stake in the outcome, are adequately represented and protected.
298
 They also ought 
to assume responsibility of ensuring that agreements are as fair and stable as possible, and 
that agreements reached are congruent with societal values.
299
 Accordingly, adequate 
mechanisms must be put in place for capacity building, accountability and regulation of ADR 
practitioners in the sector. 
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To inspire perceptions of the credibility of ADR processes, the ADR system must be 
designed to ensure the impartiality and neutrality of practitioners and administering 
institutions. The administration of the processes must not be subject to conflict of interests.
300
 
For instance, the INEC must not be charged with the administration of disputes to which it is 
a party or otherwise has an interest in circumstances that could impugn its neutrality and 
impartiality. The reason for this is that perception of partiality undermines the credibility and 
efficiency of ADR. For example, the inefficiency of mediation efforts by the National 
Mediation Commission of the Electoral Process (CNMPE), AU, SADC, COMESA, ICGLR 
and ECCAS during the 2011 election conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo was 
attributed to a lack of trust by the electoral stakeholders in the institutions due to the 
perceived lack of impartiality and neutrality of the institutions.
301
  
Achieving efficiency of ADR in EDR also necessitates the empowerment and support 
of ADR administering and regulatory institutions.
302
 Apart from capacity-building through 
training and infrastructural provision, it is fundamental that the government, relevant 
agencies and politicians afford the institutions the freedom and resources to function 
objectively and independently. The institutions must not be financially, materially or 
politically manipulated for the advantage of some parties. Conversely, the stakeholders must 
support and cooperate with the institutions to ensure success of the processes. Any contrary 
action could frustrate ADR efforts and undermine the efficiency of the system. For example, 
according to Shale and Robert, the frustration of mediation efforts during the 2011 electoral 
crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo was partly due to lack of trust by the stakeholders 
in the CNMPE, predicated on the manipulation of its decisions by the Commission Électorale 
Nationale Indépendante (CENI) chairperson who was perceived as the president’s friend.
303
 
As the authors also indicate, in the 2007 post-election crisis in Lesotho, the reason cited for 
the failure of the SADC-led mediation by the former president of Botswana, Ketumile Masire 
was the lack of cooperation from the government of Lesotho.
304
 The independence and 
credibility of ADR administering institutions and the support of stakeholders for the 
institutions are therefore critical to the effectiveness of ADR in EDR. Whereas the support of 
the government and stakeholders aids successful administration of the system, the 
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independence and credibility of ADR administering institutions excite confidence, acceptance 
and support of the stakeholders for the system.
305
 
Other relevant institutions in the electoral sector also need to be independent and 
credible for ADR to be functional in EDR in Nigeria.
306
 Institutions such as the INEC, 
judiciary and police, even where not designed to administer ADR, must be competent, 
impartial and responsible. If the INEC that is charged with the conduct of elections is 
perceived to be incompetent, partial or corrupt in its operations, the disposition of the public 
to the adoption of ADR will be adversely affected because the institution would lack the trust 
and acceptance of the parties that are requisite for successful amicable resolution of disputes 
involving the institution. There may be concerns, for instance, that the institution would 
manipulate records of the dispute or not be reliable in its presentations. Similarly, where the 
judiciary is corrupt, the confidence of the public in the entire justice system would be 
adversely affected. This is especially so as parties may have to rely on the courts for 
enforcement of ADR outcomes in case of non-compliance, since ADR lacks coercive powers 
for enforcement. It may, therefore, be regarded an exercise in futility to adopt ADR when its 
outcomes may be unenforceable due to the weakness of the judiciary. In the same vein, the 
corruption or inefficiency of the police may negatively impact the efficiency of ADR as it 
would render the institution exploitable by corrupt politicians for the intimidation of adverse 
parties and frustration of ADR proceedings and outcome enforcement.   
Achieving the efficiency of ADR in EDR also requires serious commitment and 
political will by the government and relevant authorities to implement reforms.
307
 This factor 
is important in Nigeria considering indications that several reform efforts have been 
hampered due to lack of commitment and political will by successive governments and 
politicians to implement reforms.
308
 On a proposed electoral reform after the 2007 general 
elections, for instance, the Nigeria Civil Society reported: 
[T]he then President Umaru Yar’adua set up the Electoral Reform Committee headed by 
former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Mohammad Uwais, for the purpose of recommending 
appropriate reform measures to the electoral system and rebuild the confidences of Nigerians 
in holding credible elections. The Committee assembled evidences, 1,466 memoranda and 
public hearings were held in 12 selected States and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) at 
which no less than 907 representations were made. 
                                                          
305
 Bolaji op cit note 23 at 76 
306
 Uwazie op cit note 22; Afolabi & Avasiloae op cit note 137 at 49. 
307
 Dahl op cit note 9 at 100; Cordenillo op cit note 22 at 6; Gray & Edgeworth op cit note 28. 
308




Till date, this report has not seen the light of day in terms of implementing its 
recommendations, which would have helped the country in tackling the legal challenges it is 
faced with in the build up to the 2015 general elections.
309
 
Particularly on the attitude towards dispute resolution, Afolabi and Avasiloae, in their report 
on the 2015 general elections, equally assert: 
By and large, the practice of political leaders did not match their public commitments to 
peace. Serious gaps endure in terms of the understanding, capacity and readiness of national 
stakeholders to actively mitigate tensions and prevent or resolve conflicts…. 
Successive governments have tended to establish commissions of inquiry and then often 
ignore their recommendations: this does nothing to allay public mistrust of political 
institutions or anger at their avoidance of accountability.
310
   
These experiences indicate that a good ADR design, good legal framework and good election 
management are not enough to ensure the efficiency and sustainability of ADR in EDR in 
Nigeria. The political will and commitment to implement proposed reforms and to withstand 
and ‘overcome inertia from those comfortable with the status quo’ are indispensable 
determinants of the efficiency and sustainability of the system.
311
  
Attitudinal change by stakeholders is another essential step in ensuring the efficiency 
and sustainability of ADR in Nigeria. Corruption, disregard for the rule of law and the 
exploitation of parochial affiliations for undue advantages in elections must be eschewed for 
ADR to be efficient and sustainable. This is to prevent dissuasion of parties from utilisation 
of ADR due to perception that the processes can be unduly influenced by monetary gains or 
ethnic affiliations, or due to doubt regarding the willingness of other disputants to comply 
with the outcome of the processes. Since success in ADR depends on the cooperation of the 
parties, the politicians must be willing to submit their disputes to resolution by ADR and 
accept the outcomes.
312
 The winner-takes-all attitude of some politicians, which propels war-
like disposition to elections and dispute resolution, must also be jettisoned since ADR 
underscores the satisfaction of interests and mutual benefits.
313
  Similarly, the apathetic and 
litigation-oriented attitudes of some members of the legal profession, which inform 
preference of litigation to ADR even where ADR is more appropriate and effective, must be 
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changed to avoid a negative influence on the disposition of disputants to ADR.
314
 The 
essence of elections and political offices must also be appreciated by stakeholders and, a non-
adversarial approach to dispute resolution must be imbibed. To realise these changes, 
rigorous sensitisation and reorientation programmes involving all stakeholders must be 
undertaken by relevant agencies, including the INEC and National Orientation Agency.
315
 
Finally, a shift of the incentive structures of politicians from a winner-takes-all 
competitive approach is necessary for the success of ADR in EDR in Nigeria.
316
 Other 
reforms are not enough to ensure the efficiency of ADR in EDR without a shift of the 
incentive structures.
317
 The reason for this is that while such reforms are transformative, their 
effects are debilitated by socio-economic inequalities.
318
 Shifting the incentive structures will 
reduce the electoral stakes, desperation of politicians, employment of unwholesome 
strategies, and the susceptibility of youths to manipulation by politicians.
319
 It will also 
inspire perceptions of justice and power balance in the society, thereby promoting positive 
disposition to the utilisation of ADR. 
Shifting the incentive structures of politicians entails affording citizens equal 
protection under the law, especially by not granting political office holders unfair 
advantages.
320
 It also involves meaningfully reviewing the value of political offices which 
propel a ‘do-or-die’ attitude to elections. Contrary actions would have adverse effect on the 
adoption of ADR. The experiences of Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo where 
ADR efforts were unsuccessful in contexts where winning elections is conceived as an 






From the history and evolution of ADR and EDR in Nigeria as well as the merits and success 
of ADR in EDR in other states, this research finds that ADR is essential and suitable for EDR 
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in Nigeria. An appraisal of the Nigerian electoral setting and a brief comparative analysis of 
the application of ADR in other states, however, reveal that the current Nigerian socio-
political ambiance is not conducive for effective utilisation of ADR in EDR. 
Notwithstanding, established principles in justice delivery and lessons drawn from past 
reform experiences of Nigeria and other states indicate that efficiency in the employment of 
ADR in EDR in Nigeria can be achieved through a comprehensive approach, which entails 
rigorous legislative, political, institutional, structural, and socio-economic reforms.  This 
research therefore concludes that despite the present challenges, ADR can be an effective 
mechanism in EDR in Nigeria, given an enabling environment through the adoption of the 
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